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In the last several sessions of Congress, significant efforts have been
made to modify the nature and scope of regulation in the ocean ship-
ping industry.I These efforts have been renewed, and proponents expect
Congress to enact regulatory reform legislation during the 98th Con-
gress.2 The specific provisions of the proposals have varied over time,
but there have been two persistent themes: (1) ocean common carriers
should be absolutely immunized from the antitrust laws,3 and (2) the
regulatory role of the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) should be
diminished. 4 The proposals, therefore, would increase reliance on self-
regulated ocean shipping cartels, known as conferences, to protect and
promote U.S. foreign commerce.
This extraordinary commitment to the "benefits" of shipping cartels
comes as the U.S. economy grows increasingly dependent on foreign
trade and vulnerable to foreign competition.5 Because foreign trade also
1. See, e.g., H.R. 4374, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); S. 1593, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R.
6899, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H.R. 11422, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. 6331 (1978).
2. The expected legislation is the Shipping Act of 1983, S. 47, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129
CONG. REC. S 1828 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1983). The House version of S. 47 is embodied in H.R. 1878,
98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H8202 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1983) [hereinafter cited as S. 47
(House Version)]. The Senate passed S. 47 on March 1, 1983. 129 CONG. REC. S 1828 (1983). The
House passed H.R. 1878 on October 17, 1983. 129 CONG. REC. H8216 (1983). The House later
vacated its passage of H.R. 1878, passing in its place a version of S. 47 which had been amended by
the House to contain certain language of H.R. 1878. 129 CONG. RFc. H8223 (1983). The two
versions of S. 47 then went to conference. For purposes of this article, "S. 47" refers to the version
passed by the Senate on March 1, 1983, whereas the version passed by the House will be referred to
as "S. 47 (House Version)."
After the writing of this article, Congress enacted the Shipping Act of 1984 (the 1984 Act), Pub.
L. No. 98-237, 98 Stat. 67 (to be codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1719). The Act became law on
March 20, 1984. An addendum to this article summarizes the legislation and reviews its impact on
the regulation of the U.S. ocean shipping industry. References to relevant provisions of the 1984
Act have been incorporated in the footnotes.
3. One of the stated objectives of the proposed Shipping Act of 1982, for example, was "to
permit ocean common carriers to conduct international liner shipping and related intermodal ac-
tivities with complete immunity from the antitrust laws." S. 1593, supra note 1, § 2(7). The 1984
Act continues this theme, albeit, with less direct language. The declaration of policy contained in
the Act states that one of its purposes is "to establish a nondiscrminatory regulatory process for the
common carriage of goods by water in the foreign commerce of the United States with a minitnum of
government intervention andregulatory costs. " Shipping Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98- 237, § 2, 98 Stat. 67,
67 (to be codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 1701) (emphasis added).
4. Set, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, REPORT ON
THE SHIPPING ACT OF 1982, S. REP. No. 414, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1982) ("The paramount
objective of this regulatory scheme [S. 1593] is to develop and maintain an efficient ocean transpor-
tation system through commercial means, with minimum government involvement . . .);
HOUSE COMM. ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL OCEAN
COMMERCE TRANSPORTATION, H.R. REP. No. 611, pt. 1, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1982) ("[T]he
entire method of regulation is changed [by H.R. 43741 to minimize government involvement in
shipping operations."). The power of the FMC to control the practices of ocean common carriers
has been limited by the 1984 Act. Set tnfa notes 385-89 and accompanying text.
5. See Hawk, InternattonalAnitrust Poliy and the /982 Acts. The Continuing Needfor Reassessment,
51 FORD. L. REV. 201, 201-207 (1982). Segenerally Study of U.S. Competitiveness (Sept. 9, 1980)
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is vital to U.S. producers, workers, and consumers, and because the pri-
mary characteristics of effective cartels are enhanced prices and dimin-
ished production or service, a policy that strengthens the position of
international shipping conferences while reducing natural market forces
should be scrutinized carefully.
This article explores the historical basis for and nature of the existing
regulatory model for the U.S. shipping industry, the reasons suggested
for the changes under consideration, and the possible impact of the pro-
posed changes. 6 The article concludes that the primary justifications for
continued regulation of ocean shipping are flawed and thus require
more serious consideration than is likely to occur through the legislative
hearing process. Alternatively, if the changes are imperative politically,
the facts suggest efficient U.S. liner companies are likely to thrive in a
more competitive regime. More radical deregulation than Congress has
considered seriously, therefore, might be desirable.
I. REGULATION OF THE OCEAN SHIPPING INDUSTRY
A. General Background
Ocean shipping conferences 7 developed in the late 1800's with the ad-
vent of steam ships.8 Sailing vessels had provided sporadic and indefi-
nite service that stimulated little ocean-borne trade. 9 Steam-powered
vessels made regularly scheduled sailings possible, however, and, as a
result, liner service developed.10 The regularity and relative speed of
ocean liners, coupled with the needs of the industrial revolution, re-
(submitted by the President to Congress as required by § 1i10 of the Trade Agreements Act of
1979), reprintd in STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 96TH
CONG., 2D SESS., EXPORT PROMOTION, EXPORT DISINCENTIVES, AND U.S. COMPETITIVENESS
273-612 (Comm. Print 1980).
6. Because the various proposals have changed from Congress to Congress and committee to
committee, no effort will be made to deal with specific provisions, although they may be used as
examples. The focus of the article will be on the major thrust of the several bills.
7. See D. MARX, INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CARTELS: A STUDY OF INDUSTRIAL SELF REG-
ULATION BY SHIPPING CONFERENCES (1953), wherein it is stated:
Shipping conferences, or rings as they are sometimes called, are agreements organized
by shipping lines to restrict or eliminate competition, to regulate and rationalize sailing
schedules and ports of call, and occasionally to arrange for the pooling of cargo, freight
monies, or net earnings ....
The basic purpose of shipping conferences is to minimize losses or to maximize profits.
Id. at 3.
8. See id. at 45-46; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, The Liner Con-
ference System Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat 3, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.4/62/Rev. 1 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Liner Conference System Report]; Agman, Competition, Rationa/izaion, and
Unitd States Shipping Policy, 8 J. MAR. L. & COMM. 1, 1 (1976); see also ROYAL COMMISSION ON
SHIPPING RINGS 75-80 (1909) [hereinafter cited as ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT].
9. D. MARX, supra note 7, at 45; see ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 75.
10. D. MARX, supra note 7, at 45. Liners provide regular service on set schedules and sail
1984]
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suited in an increased demand for shipping services.II As the demand
for liner services increased, faster and larger steam ships were built and
placed in service.12 Ultimately, the volume of available service exceeded
demand, and shipping lines began competing aggressively for available
carriage. 13 Liner companies responded with mergers, acquisitions, and
the formation of conferences. 14 Conferences were believed by many to
benefit both carriers and shippers. 15 Carriers benefited by reduced com-
petition, operating and administrative economies, shared risks of opera-
tion, and assurance of a compensatory rate level. 16 Shippers, in turn,
received stable and reliable services and rates.
17
Although the early conferences claimed to protect the interests of
shippers as well as their own members, they frequently abused their con-
certed economic power, and as a result, many shippers viewed the com-
binations with alarm.' Complaints by shippers' organizations and
concerns of nations without maritime fleets' 9 led to two major investiga-
tions of the shipping industry20 shortly after the turn of the century.2 '
In 1906, the Royal Commission on Shipping Rings was appointed to
investigate the impact of conferences on the commerce of the United
Kingdom.2 2 The Royal Commission issued majority and minority re-
ports in 1909.23 The majority opined that the danger of shipping con-
whether or not their space is fully utilized. Hanson, Regulation of the Shipping Industry. An Economic
Analysis ofthe Needfor Reform, 12 LAw & POL. INT'L Bus. 973, 974-975 (1980).
11. B. DEAKIN, SHIPPING CONFERENCES, A STUDY OF THEIR ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT AND
ECONOMIC PRACTICES 15-21 (1973); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STUDY OF THE REGULATED OCEAN
SHIPPING INDUSTRY 6-7 (Jan. 1977) [hereinafter cited as JUSTICE DEPARTMENT STUDY].
12. D. MARX, supra note 7, at 45.
13. Id at 46; Kryvoruka, American Ocean Shipping and th Antitrust Laws Revisited, II J. MAR. L.
& COMM. 67, 71 (1979).
14. D. MARX, supra note 7, at 47-48. There are several distinct types of liner agreements:
freight conference agreements, rate agreements, pooling agreements, joint service agreements, sail-
ing agreements, transshipment agreements, and cooperative working agreements. 46 C.F.R.
§ 522.2(a) (1982).
15. The term carriers refers to shipping lines (e.g., U.S. Lines), and the term shippers refers to
those utilizing the carriers' transportation services.
16. D. MARX, supra note 7, at 47; Kryvoruka, supra note 13, at 72.
17. See HOUSE COMM. ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, REPORT ON STEAMSHIP
AGREEMENTS AND AFFILIATIONS IN THE AMERICAN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC TRADE, H.R. Doc.
No. 805, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 51, 295-302 (1914) [hereinafter cited as ALEXANDER REPORT]. The
report is named after Joshua W. Alexander, then chairman of House Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries.
18. H.R. REP. No. 611,.supra note 4, at 16.
19. D. MARX, supra note 7, at 48-49.
20. Se ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8; ALEXANDER REPORT, supra note 17.
2 1. D. MARX, supra note 7, at 48-49; ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8; ALEXANDER
REPORT, supra note 17.
22. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at i-ii; set D. MARX, supra note 7, at 49.
23. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 1-90 (majority report), 93-116 (minority
report). A subsequent Canadian Committee noted that the majority members of the Royal Coin-
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ferences acquiring excessive power was limited by (1) competition from
tramps24 and nonconference liners, (2) internal service competition, and
(3) competition from other concerted shippers' organizations and con-
ferences.2 5 The majority proposed that the British Board of Trade be
empowered to appoint conciliators or arbitrators to resolve differences
between shipping conference lines and associations or committees of
shippers. 26 The majority concluded that the benefit to shippers realized
through conference participation outweighed the danger of concen-
trated power, which could be minimized by administrative interven-
tion.2 7 The minority of the Royal Commission believed the majority
had exaggerated the advantages of the shipping conference system 28
mission were largely identified with shipping interests, while the minority were not. JOURNALS OF
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, DOMINION OF CANADA, Appendix to 60th Vol., xi (1923), quoted in D.
MARX, supra note 7, at 50 n.7.
24. "A tramp ship, in traditional terms, is one that operates on an irregular or non-scheduled
basis from one port of lading to one port discharge, lifting one dry cargo commodity, usually of low
value, without mark or count, and from one shipper to one consignee." 1. HEINE, THE U.S. MARI-
TIME INDUSTRY, IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST 88 (1980).
25. ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 77.
26. Id at 89. The majority of the Royal Commission also recommended that conferences
employing deferred rebates be required to file conference agreements with the Board of Trade and
that the Board be allowed to conduct investigations whenever important national interests were
involved. Id
27 Id.
28. Id at 95. The minority of the Royal Commission was extremely critical of the conference
system:
Summing up the conclusions at which we have arrived:
(.) The Conference system with the deferred rebate - the natural evolution of a highly
organised trade dealing with customers for the most part scattered or disorganised - has
created on almost all the chief Ocean routes a monopoly, the limitations upon which are
in many cases illusory, and which generally tend to decline;
(2.) The system was introduced in the first instance with the objective of raising or
preventing their fall and diminishing competition;
(3.) It has been successful in raising or keeping up rates;
(4.) The public have, as a rule, to pay higher rates of freight than they would pay in an
open market.
(5.) The system has been injurious to 'tramps,' the strongest element in the British mer-
cantile marine, and it leads . . . to waste and to higher rates of freight;
(6.) The system tends to waste in various other directions, owing to the manner in which
the Rings are constituted; (Since conferences are a partnership monopoly there is less
rationalization and perhaps none.]
(7.) There is no satisfactory evidence that the saving in cost, if there is any . . . exceeds
the waste which is due to that system;
(9.) The system tends to inflate the amount of tonnage and consequently the amount of
capital invested upon which interest has to be paid.
(I 1.) It gives a country such as the United States, in which the system is illegal, an advan-
tage as compared with the United Kingdom.
(12.) It has caused in the case of South Africa a diversion of British trade. (13.) There is
no evidence that it has appreciably increased regularity of sailing or greatly improved the
quality of steamers; but it has tended to bring about equality and stability of rates.
Id. at 114.
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and, therefore, refused to concur in the recommendations of the
majority.2 9
In 1912, the U.S. House of Representatives directed the Committee
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries to investigate combinations in the
ocean shipping industry.30 The Committee conducted an intensive in-
vestigation of the practices of the ocean shipping industry and published
the results in the Alexander Report in 1914. 3 1 The House Committee
found benefits in the conference system,3 2 as had the Royal Commission,
but it also found that conference carriers had abused their collective
power.3 3 It recommended the creation of a regulatory body to guard
against such abuses.3 4 The Committee's report ultimately resulted in
passage of the Shipping Act of 1916. 3 5
The international response to shipping cartels has varied among na-
tions and over time. The United Kingdom has opted for relatively in-
dependent conferences subject to the countervailing power of shippers'
organizations. 36 Some nations have bargained directly with liner con-
ferences on behalf of their shippers,3 7 and others have established state-
run shipping companies to compete with conferences. 38 Still others have
imposed varying degrees of governmental regulation. 39 The intent of
each of these responses has been to prevent conferences from exercising
their monopoly power to the detriment of consumers, shippers, or com-
peting ocean carriers.4°
29. Id at 95-116. The recommendations of the Royal Commission minority were similar to
those submitted by the majority, giving the Board of Trade power to recognize shipping confer-
ences, but without the reservations and restrictions of the majority report. See id at 114-16.
30. H.R. Res. 425, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., 48 CONG. R_.c. 2835-36 (1912); H.R. Res. 587, 62d
Cong., 2d Sess., 48 CONG. REc. 8350 (1912).
31. ALEXANDER REPORT, supra note 17; see ibfa text accompanying notes 82-87.
32. Se n#a text accompanying notes 84-85.
33. ALEXANDER REPORT, supra note 17, at 304-07; see inqfa notes 86-87 and accompanying
text.
34. H.R. REP. No. 659, 64th Cong., Ist Sess. (1916).
35. Shipping Act of 1916, ch. 451, 39 Stat. 728 (current version at 46 U.S.C. §.801-842
(1982)).
36. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27. Australia also has sanctioned a comprehensive
shippers' organization, known as the Australian Oversea Transport Association (A.O.T.A.), to bar-
gain with ocean carriers. D. MARX, supra note 7, at 93- 95; Agman, supra note 8, at 21-22.
37. D. MARX, supra note 7, at 92-97. For example, South Africa and New Zealand bargain
directly with shipping conferences on behalf of their shippers. Id.
38. I. HEINE, supra note 24, at 157. Australia established a national line at the end of World
War I, but ultimately abandoned that approach in favor of a strong shippers' council. Agman,
supra note 8, at 20-22.
39. Seegenerally, D. MARX, supra note 7, at 84-104.
40. See id. at 103.
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B. Economic Consideratons4 1
1. Justification for Shipping Conferences
Those seeking to justify the cartelized ocean liner system suggest that
the industry's cost structure makes a total commitment to competition
unacceptable. 42 As a result of the development of new vessel and related
support technology,4 3 ocean shipping has become increasingly capital
intensive. A modern container ship, for example, may cost in excess of
$100 million, 44 and container-related terminal facilities are similarly ex-
pensive to produce. 45 The ratio of fixed to variable costs is an even more
significant factor than the high absolute costs. Approximately seventy-
five percent of the costs of ocean liner operators is fixed.46 These high
fixed costs, coupled with a perceived inelastic demand for shipping serv-
ices, 4 7 may induce carriers to engage in aggressive price competition to
recover variable costs during times of slack demand. 48 If this competi-
tion, usually described by carriers as destructive or cut-throat, 4 9 contin-
ues for an extended period, the industry may experience numerous
failures.5 Thus, proponents of the cartelized ocean liner system con-
clude that conferences resolve this problem by eliminating competition
and raising rates to a level that ensures long-term profits.5t
Proponents of the system argue further that only a cartelized system
41. A full development of the economics of ocean liner shipping is beyond the scope of this
article. For discussions of liner economics, see generally B. DEAKIN, supra note 11; R. Goss,
STUDIES IN MARITIME ECONOMICS (1968); D. MARX, supra note 7; Agman, supra note 8;
Bennathan & Walters, Shipping Conferences: An Economic Anaysi, 4 J. MAR. L. & COMM. 93 (1972);
Hanson, supra note 10, at 976-82.
42. See Agman, supra note 8, at 11 -14.
43. Id
44. SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, REPORT ON S. 504,
To IMPROVE THE INTERNATIONAL OCEAN COMMERCE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM OF THE
UNITED STATES, S. REP. No. 3, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1983).
45 Agman, supra note 8, at 12.
46. S. REP. No. 3, supra note 44, at 9. As with capital expenditures, the proportion of fixed to
total costs has increased with the advent and production of container vessels. Agman, supra note 8,
at 12-13. The designation of particular costs as fixed or variable, however, cannot be made with
mathematical precision. For example, costs that will generally be considered fixed for liners may be
treated as variable for tramps. D. MARX, supra note 7, at 12.
47. S. REP. No. 3, supra note 44, at 8.
48. See Agman, supra note 8, at 10; Kryvoruka, supra note 13, at 72.
49. The normative concept of "destructive" competition has lost much of its credibility in
related transportation industries. See Bennathan & Walters, supra note 41, at 97; Oversight Hearings
on Maritime Antitrus.t, Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 97-98 (1982) (testimony of Thomas J. Campbell, Director, Bureau of
Competition, Federal Trade Commission, and Robert D. Tollison, Director, Bureau of Economics,
Federal Trade Commission) [hereinafter cited as Maritime Antitrust Oversight Hearings].
50. Bennathan & Walters, supra note 41, at 96.
51. d.
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can protect shippers given the economics of the shipping industry. 52
They argue that conferences protect shippers against the ultimate mo-
nopoly that would follow extensive rate wars. 53 The Alexander Re-
port, 54 for example, stated:
To terminate existing agreements would necessarily bring about one
of two results: the lines would either engage in rate wars which would
mean the elimination of the weak and the survival of the strong, or, to
avoid a costly struggle, they would consolidate through common own-
ership. Neither result can be prevented by legislation, and either
would mean a monopoly fully as effective, and it is believed more so,
than can exist by virtue of an agreement. 55
Conference agreements are more frequently justified as a source of
stable and nondiscriminatory services and rates.56 Although conference
carrier rates may be higher than they would be in competitive markets,
they provide a degree of certainty that allows shippers to calculate costs
and to depend on regular sailings. 57
2. Flawed Economic Assumptions
Several of the economic premises underlying legalized shipping car-
tels, however, are questionable. First, the belief that the demand for
shipping services is unresponsive to rate changes - that it is inelastic -
is at best a gross generalization. Several factors actually affect the elas-
ticity of demand for ocean carriage. One economic study shows that
demand becomes more elastic as freight rates increase as a percentage of
total delivered costs. 58 The study also shows that demand is largely de-
rived from and varies directly with the demand for the product being
shipped.59 Demand is therefore elastic for some goods and relatively
unresponsive to rate changes for others. Furthermore, the response of
particular shippers to rate changes depends on the transportation alter-
natives available. Those shippers facing the highest freight rates may
view air transportation as an alternative, 60 while those shipping goods
subject to low tariff rates may find bulk carriers and tramps to be a
realistic alternative to liner service. 6 1 Shippers in both instances may be
52. Schmeltzer & Weiner, Liner Shipping in te 1980"f." Competitive Patterm and Lgislatwe inaia-
tives in the 96th Congretu, 12 J. MAR. L. & COMM. 25, 29-30 (1980).
53. Id
54. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
55. ALEXANDER REPORT, supra note 17, at 416.
56. See S. REP. No. 3, supra note 44, at 9; The Liner Conference System, supra note 8, at 5;
Bennathan & Walters, supra note 41, at 98-99.
57. See The Liner Conference System Report, supra note 8, at 5-6.
58- B. DEAKIN, supra note 11, at 144.
59 Id at 8, 144; see also D. MARX, supra note 7, at 16.
60 B. DEAKIN, supra note 11, at 215.
61 Id
[Vol. 18
U_. S Commitment to Carte/s
sensitive and highly responsive to liner rate changes.6 2
Second, there is evidence that aggressive competition in the liner in-
dustry will not result in the significant number of bankruptcies or the
ultimate single-firm monopoly feared by proponents of the cartelized
system. Related transportation industries, such as trucking, have not
become unduly concentrated following deregulation,63 and liners have
survived in those routes where the conference system has been unsuc-
cessful.64 Concentration has increased among American liner compa-
nies in recent years,6 5 primarily as a result of -technological change or
mismanagement,6 despite the existence of conferences. Failures are un-
likely unless liner firms dramatically miscalculate the long-term demand
for their services.6 7 The propriety of shifting the costs of such miscalcu-
lations to shippers has been questioned: "[E]ven if shipowners over-built
consistently, it is reasonable to expect them to pay for their own mis-
takes. It is unfair to expect the shippers to pay - in markets rigged
with high cartelized rates - for the follies of owners." 68
Finally, stability, which is the principal perceived benefit of confer-
ences to shippers, might not be as certain or as beneficial as proponents
of collective liner activities claim. Liner rates are less responsive to mar-
ket forces, but more responsive to changes in costs, 69 than are tramp
rates. As a result, liner rates tend to be higher than those of tramps
during periods of slack demand and lower when demand peaks. 70 In
spite of this relative overall stability, however, individual shippers may
face substantial fluctuations based on surcharges, rebates, and rate cuts
during periodic rate wars. 7t These factors make individual rates for
liner services more volatile than the general tariffs would indicate. Sta-
bility also comes at a cost that is imposed on all conference customers
regardless of their individual needs or desires. One study of the cartel
shipping system stated:
62. Id Even within the mid-range of rates - those not generally subject to competition from
air carriers or tramps - the elasticity of demand varies, with elasticity tending to be higher at the
lower end of this mid-range. Id
63. See Bennathan & Walters, supra note 41, at 97-98.
64. Id at 98.
65. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COM-
MITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, GAO/PAD-
82-11, I1 (1982) [hereinafter cited as GAO REPORT]. "[T]he number of U.S. flag liner carriers
declined from 19 in 1970 to 9 in 1981." Id.
66. Id.
67. See Bennathan & Walters, supra note 41, at 97.
68. Id.
69. D. ROBERTSON, ECONOMIC FRAGMENTS 122 (1931),citdwit appwrovalin D. MARX, supra
note 7, at 242.
70. Id
71. Bennathan & Walters, supra note 41, at 99
19841
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The rate stability that is in fact being sold by the conferences is, of
course, part and parcel of the sale of total conference service; the
buyer gets it and pays for it whether he likes it or not. If he wants
more stability he may be able to buy it at Lloyd's, but he cannot
contract for less. If the cartel is successful in fighting down outside
competition, shippers who would prefer a lower rate and less stability
have no choice; they cannot sell any part of the stability they get. 72
As a result of the system, those shippers less interested in services and
rate stability must subsidize those that are more concerned with cer-
tainty. 73 Furthermore, the rate stability established by shipping cartels
"tends to destabilize other prices and incomes. ' ' 74
If freight rates do not respond to market stimuli, the prices and reve-
nues of producers and shippers must make the needed adjustment. The
"instability" inherent in a market economy does not disappear when
ocean freight rates are fixed. The response to fluctuations in supply or
demand that naturally should be experienced by ocean carriers is shifted
to others in the relevant chain of production and distribution. Carriers,
rather than consumers, dictate how scarce resources will be allocated
and consumer demand satisfied.
To summarize, the predominant economic justification given for ship-
ping conferences is that they prevent destructive competition in an in-
dustry with high fixed costs and inelastic demand. 75 Conferences
purportedly prevent absolute monopolization 76 and provide stable serv-
ice and rates.77 Some economists, however, question many of the under-
lying assumptions regarding the impact of competition and the benefits
of cartels in the ocean shipping industry.78 Their studies show that the
demand for shipping services is responsive at times to certain rate
changes, 79 that competition in the industry will not result in an ultimate
all-powerful monopoly,8° and that the cost of "stability" in the
cartelized industry is high and ultimately borne by the consumer.8 '
c. shipping Act of 1916
1. Legislative History
In 1914, the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries
72. Id at 100-01.
73. Id at 101
74. Id
75. See supra notes 42-57 and accompanying text.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55.
77 See supra text accompanying notes 56-57
78. See supra notes 58-74 and accompanying text.
79 See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
80 See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
81 See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
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The 1984 Act allows concerted liner activities to enjoy almost total
antitrust immunity. s1 The new legislation retains the FMC as the prin-
cipal and initial authority to enforce all prohibitions of the statute; anti-
trust agencies are to challenge activites of ocean common carriers as
antitrust violations only in the event an "enforcement vacuum" has oc-
curred. 3s 2 The antitrust laws apply, however, only if there is no reason-
able basis to believe the activity was identified in an effective agreement
or otherwise exempt from the filing requirement of the 1984 Act. 38 3 Fi-
nally, the most potent weapon in the antitrust arsenal, the private treble
damage action, was eliminated as a remedy for injuries caused by activi-
ties in violation of antitrust law which also violate the 1984 Act.38 4
The FMC, once able to disapprove an agreement solely on the
grounds that it was detrimental to the public interest,385 may now disap-
prove only those agreements that fail to meet the minimal requirements
of section 5 of the 1984 Act. 38 6 An agreement that satisfies section 5
House to S. 47 reported to their respective Houses on February 23, 1984. CONFERENCE REPORT
TO ACCOMPANY S. 47, H.R. REP. No. 600, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. I (hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE
REPORT). The recommendations of the conference committee were adopted by both Houses of
Congress. The Senate passed the conference version of S.47 on February 23, 1984, 130 Cong. Rec.
S1603; the House on March 6, 1984, 130 Cong. Rec. H1297. The President signed the Shipping
Act of 1984 into law on March 20, 1984.
381. See Shipping Act of 1984, § 7, 98 Stat. at 73-74 (to be codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 1706).
Section 7 of the 1984 Act states, inter alia, that the antitrust laws do not apply to
any activity or agreement within the scope of this Act, whether permitted under or pro-
hibited by this Act, undertaken or entered into with a reasonable basis to conclude that
(A) it is pursuant to an agreement on file with the Commission and in effect when the
activity took place, or (B) it is exempt under section 16 of this Act from any filing require-
ment of this Act.
Id § 7(a)(2), 98 Stat. at 73 (to be codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 1706(a)(2)). Prior to the 1984 Act,
parties acting pursuant to an unapproved agreement were subject to the full extent of the antitrust
laws. Se supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
382. See CONFERENCE REPORT, suOra note 380, at 29.
383. See Shipping Act of 1984, § 7(a)(2), 98 Stat. at 73 (to be codified at 46 U.S.C. app.
§ 1706(a)(2)).
384. Shipping Act of 1984, § 7(c)(2), 98 Stat. at 74 (to be codified at 46 U.S.C. app.
§ 1706(c)(2)). The 1984 Act does not limit the amount of award to actual injuries in every instance.
Section 11(g) states:
For any complaint filed within 3 years after the cause of action accrued, the Commission
shall, upon petition of the complainant and after notice and hearing, direct payment of
reparations to the complainant for actual injury (which, for purposes of this subsection,
also includes the loss of interest at commercial rates compounded from the date of injury)
caused by a violation of this Act plus reasonable attorney fees. Upon a showing that the
injury was caused by activity that is prohibited by section 10(b)(5) or (7) or section
10(c)(1) or (4) of this Act, or that violates section 10(a)(2) or (3), the Commission may
direct the payment of additional amounts; hut the toal recovey of a complainant may not exceed
twice the amount of tAe actual injury.
Id. § lI(g), 98 Stat. at 80-81 (to be codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 1710(g)) (emphasis added).
385. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
386. Shipping Act of 1984, § 6(b), 98 Stat. at 72 (to be codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 1705(b)).
Section 5 reads in relevant part:
(b) CONFERENCE AGREEMENTS. - Each conference agreement must -
(1) state its purpose;
Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ. [Vol. 18
requirements normally will become effective within forty-five days after
filing.M7 If, however, the agreement is "likely, by a reduction in compe-
tition, to produce an unreasonable reduction in transportation service or
an unreasonable increase in transportation cost," 3 8 8 the FMC may seek
to enjoin its operation.m9
The 1984 Act differs from the bills passed by the House and Senate in
the ,area of service contracts. The use of service contracts, which en-
hance the possibility of both discrimination and competition, 39° was
limited severely in the bills enacted by both Houses of Congress. The
"prohibited acts" section of each bill contained a provision which
barred common carriers from giving unreasonable preferences to any
person.39' Such provision may have limited unreasonably discriminatory
service contracts.392 The conference committee, however, amended the
section to permit discrimination through service contracts. 393 The con-
ferees .also noted that an ocean shipping conference may prohibit its
members from entering into service contracts. 3 94 A conference's ability
(2) provide reasonable and equal terms and conditions for admission and readmission to
conference membership for any ocean common carrier willing to serve the particular
trade or route;
(3) permit any member to withdraw from conference membership upon reasonable notice
without penalty;
(4) at the request of any member, require an independent neutral body to police fully the
obligations of the conference and its members;
(5) prohibit the conference from engaging in conduct prohibited by section 10(c)(1) or (3)
of this Act;
(6) provide for a consultation process designed to promote -
(A) commercial resolution of disputes, and
(B) cooperation with shippers in preventing and eliminating malpractices;
(7) establish procedures for promptly and fairly considering shippers' requests and com-
plaints; and
(8) provide that any member of the conference may take independent action on any rate
or service item required to be filed in a tariff under section 8(a) of this Act upon not more
than 10 calendar days' notice to the conference and that the conference will include the
new rate or service item in its tariff for use by that member, effective no later than 10
calendar days after receipt of the notice, and by any other member that notifies the con-
ference that it elects to adopt the independent rate or service item on or after its effective
date, in lieu of the existing conference tariff provision for that rate or service item.
(c) INTERCONFERENCE AGREEMENTS. - Each agreement between carriers not
members of the same conference must provide the right of independent action for each
carrier. Each agreement between conferences must provide the right of independent ac-
tion for conference.
Id § 5(b)-(c), 98 Stat. at 71 (to be codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 1704(b)-(c)).
387. Id § 6(c)(1), 98 Stat. at 72 (to be codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 1705(c)(1)).
388. Id § 6(g), 98 Stat. at 72-73 (to be codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 1705(g)).
389. Id § 6(h), 98 Stat. at 73 (to be codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 1705(h)).
390. See supra text accompanying notes 315-20.
391. S. 47, supra note 2, § 12(d)(2), S. 47 (House Version), supra note 2, § 9(b)(1). For the full
list of prohibited acts contained in § 9 of S. 47 (House Version), see supra note 223.
392. Se supra notes 315-20 and accompanying text.
393. Ser Shipping Act of 1984, § 10(b)(1 1), 98 Stat. at 78 (to be codified at 46 U.S.C. app.
§ 1709(b)(1 1)).
394. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 380, at 29.
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published the Alexander Report, 2 which provided the factual basis for
adoption of the Shipping Act of 1916.83 The Alexander Report con-
cluded that U.S. foreign commerce could benefit from the continued
existence of shipping conferences.8 4 It stated that the conference system
secured greater regularity of service, faster and better vessels, extended
periods of stable rates, uniformity of rates to all merchants rather than
the preferential treatment accorded larger shippers in time of rate wars,
and the maintenance of rates from the United States to foreign countries
on a parity with those from other countries.8 5
The report also said, however, that the conference system generated
problems natural to cartels, such as high and discriminatory rates, poor
service, and predatory conduct.8 6 In its report to the House, the com-
mittee stated that "effective Government control" was the only way to
strike a balance between the benefits of concerted carrier activities and
their "inherent" abusive proclivities.
8 7
The Shipping Act of 1916 established a multifarious regulatory for-
mat. Some practices of the conferences were expressly prohibited, in-
cluding the use of "fighting ships,"' a  "deferred rebates,"8 9  and
retaliatory or discriminatory rates or services. 9° The Act authorized the
U.S. Shipping Board, a predecessor of the Federal Maritime Commis-
82. ALEXANDER REPORT, supra note 17; see supra text accompanying notes 30-35.
83. Shipping Act of 1916, ch. 451, 39 Stat. 728 (current version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-842
(1982).
84. ALEXANDER REPORT, supra note 17, at 295-303.
85. Id at 295-302.
86. Id at 417. The Alexander Report noted:
A considerable number of complaints were also filed with the committee [by exporters
and importers] objecting to excessive rates, discrimination between shippers in rates and
cargo space, indifference to the landing of freight in proper condition, arbitrariness in the
settlement of just claims, failure to give due notice to shippers when rates were to be
increased, refusal to properly adjust rates as between various classes of commodities, and
the unfairness of certain methods - such as fighting ships, deferred rebates and threats to
refuse shipping accommodations - used by some conferences to meet the competition of
nonconference lines.
Id.
87 Id at 417-18.
88. Shipping Act of 1916, ch. 451, § 14, 39 Stat. 728, 733 (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 812
(1982)). The Act definesjfigh/Mg shzp as "a vessel used in a particular trade by a carrier or group of
carriers for the purpose of excluding, preventing, or reducing competition by driving another car-
rier out of said trade." Id
89. Id. The statute defines deferred rebate as
a return of any portion of the freight money by a carrier to any shipper as a consideration
for the giving of all or any portion of his shipments to the same or any other carrier, or for
any other purpose, the payment of which is deferred beyond the completion of the service
for which it is paid, and is made only if, during both the period for which computed and
the period of deferment, the shipper has complied with the terms of the rebate agreement
or arrangement.
Id
90. Id §§ 14, 16, 39 Stat. 733-34 (current version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 812, 815 (1982)).
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sion, 9 ' to disapprove international rates that were "so unreasonably high
or low as to be detrimental to the commerce of the United States."'92
Section 15 contained the Act's primary regulatory mechanism. 9 3 Sec-
tion 15 required common carriers and others subject to the Act to file
with the Shipping Board all agreements, including memoranda specify-
ing the terms of oral agreements involving, inter alia, rates and the allo-
cation or limitation of services.9 The Act authorized the Board to
disapprove agreements found to be unjustly discriminatory or unfair,
detrimental to the commerce of the United States, or in violation of the
Shipping Act.9 5 Parties to an approved agreement were exempt from
the Sherman Act96 and the Wilson Tariff Act 97 when acting within the
91. The authorized regulatory agency of the Shipping Act of 1916 has had several names.
The Federal Maritime Commission was created by Reorganization Plan No. 7 of 1961. 3 C.F.R. at
874 (1959-1963 compilation).
92. Shipping Act of 1916, ch. 451, § 18, 39 Stat. 728, 735 (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 813a
(1982)).
93. Id § 15, 39 Stat. 733 (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1982)).
94. Id. The current version of section 15 states in relevant part:
Every common carrier by water, or other person subject to this act shall file immediately
with the Commission a true copy, or, if oral, a true and complete memorandum, of every
agreement with another such carrier or other person subject to this act, or modification or
cancellation thereof, to which it may be a party or conform in whole or in part, fixing or
regulating transportation rates or fares; giving or receiving special rates, accomodations,
or other special privileges or advantages; controlling, regulating, preventing, or destroying
competition; pooling or apportioning earnings, losses, or traffic; allotting ports or restrict-
ing or otherwise regulating the number and character of sailings between ports; limiting
or regulating in any way the volume or character of freight or passenger traffic to be
carried; or in any manner providing for an exclusive, preferential, or cooperative working
arrangement. The term "agreement" in this section includes understandings, conferences,
and other arrangements, but does not include maritime labor agreements . . . . The
Commission shall . . .disapprove, cancel or modify any agreement, or any modification
or cancellation thereof, whether or not previously approved by it, that it finds to be un-
justly discriminatory or unfair as between carriers, shippers, exporters, importers, or ports,
or between exporters from the United States and their foreign competitors, or to operate
to the detriment of the commerce of the United States, or to be contrary to the public
interest, or to be in violation of this act, and shall approve all other agreements, modifica-
tions, or cancellations. No such agreement shall be approved, nor shall continued-ap-
proval be permitted for any agreement (1) between carriers not members of the same
conference or conferences or carriers serving different trades that would otherwise be nat-
urally competitive unless in the case of agreements between carriers, each carrier, or in the
case of agreements between conferences, each conference, retains the right of independent
action, or (2) in respect to any conference agreement, which fails to provide reasonable
and equal terms and conditions for admission and readmission to conference membership
of other qualified carriers in the trade, or fails to provide that any member may withdraw
from membership upon reasonable notice without penalty for such withdrawal.
46 U.S.C. § 814 (1982).
95. Shipping Act of 1916, ch. 451, § 15, 39 Stat. 728, 733 (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 814
(1982)).
96. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
97. Id §§8-11.
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terms of such an agreement. 9 Those acting pursuant to an unapproved
agreement were in violation of the Shipping Act and were subject to the
full extent of the antitrust laws.99
Amendments to the Shipping Act in 1961 were prompted by the 1958
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Federal Martime Board . Isbrandtsen
Co. 100 In Isbrandtsen, the Court held that the dual rate contract system,
widely used by conferences to foster shipper loyalty, violated the Ship-
ping Act if employed as a predatory device.10 1 A "dual rate" contract
provides lower rates to shippers that commit themselves to ship all or a
specified portion of their cargo to the contract carrier or conference.10 2
Congress immediately suspended the effect of the Isbrandsen decision for
two years and began an investigation into the dual rate system.t0 3 Con-
gress ultimately enacted section 14b of the Shipping Act, which permit-
ted the use of dual rate contracts approved by the FMC. 104 This section
98. Shipping Act of 1916, ch. 451, § 15, 39 Stat. 728, 733 (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 814
(1982))
99. Id Several Supreme Court decisions, based on the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, raised
some questions about the applicability of the antitrust laws to liner activities. See, e.g., United
States Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S; 474 (1932); see also H-arings on HR 6899 &fore
the Subcornm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm on thejudiciay, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
91-92 (1980) (statement of Robert J. Blackwell on behalf of Council of American Flag-Ship Opera-
tors). [hereinafter cited as Hearngs on H.R. 66999]. A decision contemporaneous with the CunardSS
Co. decision, however, explicitly noted that the available antitrust exemption in the Shipping Act
was limited to approved agreements. United States v. American Union Transport, 327 U.S. 437, 447
n.8 (1946).
100. 356 U.S. 481 (1958).
101. Id at 499.
102. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc. v. Fed. Maritime Comm'n, 380 F.2d 609, 619
(D.C. Cir. 1.967).
103. Act of Aug. 12, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-626, § 1, 72 Stat. 574.
104. Act of Oct. 3, 1961, Pub. L No. 87-346, § i, 75 Stat. 762 (codified as amended at 46
U.S.C. § 813a (1982)). Section 14b of the Shipping Act states, in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Chapter, on application the Federal Mari-
time Commission (hereinafter "Commission"), shall ... permit the use by any common
carrier or conference of such carriers in foreign commerce of any contract, amendment, or
modification thereof, which is available to all shippers and consignees on equal terms and
conditions, which provides lower rates to a shipper or consignee who agrees to give all or
any fixed portion of his patronage to such carrier or conference of carriers unless the
Commission finds that the contract, amendment, or modification thereof will be detri-
mental to the commerce of the United States or contrary to the public interest, or unjustly
discriminatory or unfair as between shippers, exporters, importers, or ports, or between
exporters from the United States and their foreign competitors, and provided the con-
tract, amendment, or modification thereof, expressly (1) permits prompt release of the
contract shipper from the contract with respect to any shipment or shipments for which
the contracting carrier or conference of carriers cannot provide as much space as the con-
tract shipper shall require on reasonable notice; (2) provides that whenever a tariff rate for
the carriage of goods under the contract becomes effective, insofar as it is under the con-
trol of the carrier or conference of carriers, it shall not be increased before a reasonable
period, but in no case less than ninety days; (3) covers only those goods of the contract
shipper as to the shipment of which he has the legal right at the time of shipment to select
the carrier . .; (4) does not require the contract shipper to divert shipment of goods from
natural routings not served by the carrier or conference of carriers where direct carriage is
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indorsed nondiscriminatory availability, set the standards for Commis-
sion approval, and established several mandatory requirements for valid
dual rate contracts.10 5
The Isbrandsen decision spawned inquiries by both the House
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee and the House Committee
on the Judiciary. The Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee
on the Judiciary inquiry quickly expanded beyond the issue of dual rate
contracts. The subcommittee published the results of its far-reaching
investigation of carrier practices and of the regulatory practices of the
Federal Maritime Board in a report known as the Celler Report. 0 6 The
report was extremely critical of conference practices, their impact on
U.S. commerce, and the performance of the Federal Maritime Board. 0 7
The report found that foreign carriers dominated conferences and voted
as a bloc against U.S. interests, 10 8 that conferences had grown in
strength since the time of the Alexander Report and had continued their
abusive monopolistic practices,' ° 9 that carriers avoided regulatory over-
sight by entering into secret, unfiled agreements, 1' 0 and that "U.S. for-
available; (5) limits damages recoverable for breach by either party to actual damages
; (6) permits the contract shipper to terminate at any time without penalty upon
ninety days' notice; (7) provides for a spread between ordinary rates and rates charged
contract shippers which the Commission finds to be reasonable in all the circumstances
but which spread shall in no event be more than 15 per centum of the ordinary rates; (8)
excludes cargo of the contract shippers which is loaded and carried in bulk . . .; and (9)
contains such other provisions not inconsistent herewith as the Commission shall require
or permit.
Id.
105. Id.
106. STAFF OF THE ANTITRUST SUBCOMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., 2D SESS., RE-
PORT ON THE OCEAN FREIGHT INDUSTRY (Comm. Print 1962) [hereinafter cited as CELLER RE-
PORT]. The report is named after Emanuel Celler, then chairman of the Antitrust Subcommittee of
the House Committee on the Judiciary.
107. Se id. at 384-99. The Federal Maritime Board, established by Reorganization Plan No.
21 of 1951.3 C.F.R. at 1012 (1949-1953 compilation), was the predecessor of the Federal Maritime
Commission.
108. CELLER REPORT, supra note 106, at 384.
109. Id at 385. The Celler Report stated:
The recommendations of the Alexander committee, culminating in the historic Ship-
ping Act of 1916, have, through no fault of that committee, utterly failed in attaining its
objectives. Over the years, the conference system has been steadily augmented in
strength, while at the same time there have continued flagrant abuses of its privileges.
This is not idle conjecture. The files of only a small number of lines selected at random by
the subcommittee for study disclosed some 240 apparent violations ofexistng Federal stat-
utes or conference agreements, including an untold number of secret and unfiled agree-
ments in violation of section 15 of the Shipping Act, both open and concealed rebating,
'fighting committees" (in lieu of the clearly outlawed "fighting ship"), numerous preda-
torv practices aimed at curtailing or impairing outside competition, geographical discrim-
inations against nations and ports. and favoritism to preferred shippers.
Id
10 Id at 391
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eign trade routes [were] rife with malpractice."'' The Antitrust
Subcommittee reserved its most serious criticism in the report for the
Federal Maritime Board. The report noted that the Board and its pred-
ecessors had never attempted seriously to regulate the industry.'" 2 For
example, the subcommittee found that the Board had no investigators
prior to 1954 and only six at the time of the inquiry,"5 and it had never
imposed the $1,000 per day fine for violations of section 15.114
In response to the Celler Report, section 15 was revised in three signif-
icant respects by the 1961 amendments: (1) interconference agreements
would be approved only if conference members retained the right of
independent action; (2) conferences were required to remain open to all
qualified carriers, which must be free to exit without penalty; and (3)
agreements would not be approved if "contrary to the public inter-
est."'" 5 These amendments strengthened the regulatory role of the Fed-
eral Maritime Commission and encouraged some measure of
competition within the conference system." 16
2. The Svenska Standard
The standards by which the FMC is to approve liner agreements
under the Shipping Act were construed by the Supreme Court in Federal
Maritime Commission v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amen'ka Ltien. "17 The Court
agreed with the decision of the FMC that agreements containing re-
straints inconsistent with antitrust principles must be closely scrutinized
prior to approval.I" The FMC had concluded that the Shipping Act is
not an absolute commitment to the conference system; rather, the Act
requires the Commission to strike an appropriate balance between the
competitive goals of the antitrust laws and the intent of the Shipping
Ill Id at 392.
112 Id at 396.
113. Id
114. Id Chairman Emanual Celler concluded that the "record of regulatory neglect by the
Federal Maritime Board is unparalleled." Id
115. Act of Oct. 3, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-346, § 2, 75 Stat. 762 (codified as amended at 46
U.S.C. § 814 (1982)).
116. See Celler Report, supra note 106, at 395. The House Committee on the Judiciary be-
lieved that the continued existence of independent competition was essential:
[lit is one thing for this country to authorize the establishment of a cartel with anticom-
petitive devices authorized by law, but it is quite another for this Government to permit
such a cartel to become a total supermonopoly unrestrained either by Government over-
sight or by free economic forces. Only by maintaining some competition against these
cartelized foreign-dominated steamship conferences can there be any hope that the funda-
mental economic interests of the United States will be preserved.
Id
117. 390 U.S. 238 (1968).
118 Id at 243.
1984)
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Act to permit certain collective conduct." 9 The FMC established that
the proponents of an agreement contrary to antitrust policy must "bring
forth such facts as would demonstrate that [the proposed activity] was
required by a serious transportation need, necessary to secure important
public benefits or in furtherance of a valid regulatory purpose of the
Shipping Act."' 20 This regulatory standard is generally identified as the
Svenska standard.' 2' The public interest in the maintenance of competi-
tion allows the FMC, therefore, to authorize anticompetitive agreements
only to the extent that they are necessary to effectuate the purposes of
the Shipping Act.' 22
Since Svenska, the FMC and the federal courts have continued to insist
that anticompetitive agreements be carefully tailored to meet legitimate
Shipping Act goals. 123 The Commission is required to conduct an ade-
quate investigation of all agreements containing anticompetitive provi-
sions.124 The FMC must scrutinize closely all agreements involving
activities that are per se illegal as well as all agreements having any
antitrust implications. 125 Proponents of anticompetitive agreements must
"meet the heavy burden of showing that, on balance, the agreement is in
the public interest."' 26
3. Commitment to Competition
The maintenance of limited competition as a check on the monopolis-
tic power of conferences always has been a goal of the Shipping Act. 127
The emphasis on competition, however, was increased significantly by
the 1961 amendments, and subsequent administrative and judicial deci-
sions have reinforced the commitment to the operation of market
forces.' 28 This heightened commitment to competition, however, runs
counter to the goals and practices of ocean shipping conferences and has
been a major irritant to conference carriers. For example, a primary
119. Investigation of Passenger Steamship Conferences Regarding Travel Agents, 10 F.M.C.
27, 33 (1966).
120. Id. at 45.
121. Heanngs on HR. 6899, supra note 99, at 72 (statement of Sanford M. Litvack, Assistant
Attorney General, Antitrust Division).
122. Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 211 F.2d 51, 57 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 990
(1954).
123. See, e.g., United States Lines v. Fed. Maritime Comm'n, 584 F.2d 519, 528 (D.C. Cir.
1978).
124. Id. at 543; Marine Space Enclosures, Inc. v. Fed. Maritime Comm'n, 420 F.2d 577, 586
(D.C. Cir. 1969).
125. Sea-Land Services v. Fed. Maritime Comm'n, 653 F.2d 544, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
126 Id at 547 (emphasis added).
127 See CELLER REPORT, supra note 106. at 26.
128 See supra notes 117-26 and accompanying text
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objective of shipping conferences is to "rationalize" trade routes.' 29 In
order to rationalize services, conferences must have effective control over
all available tonnage.' s° To achieve this control, conferences histori-
cally have employed tying devices,' 3' limited their own membership,
and driven independent carriers out of their trades.'3 2 One industry an-
alyst has stated that rationalization is fostered best by accepting and
sanctioning the use of closed conferences and making the institutional
changes necessary to facilitate rationalization.' 33 United States anti-
trust policy, however, is antagonistic to both closed conferences and ty-
ing devices.134 The maintenance of competition in. the shipping
industry, even though limited, has been an obvious source of tension in
an industry committed to the collective rationalization of services.
The Shipping Act currently responds in three ways to the probability
that conference members will abuse their collective power. First, the
Shipping Act, through section 15, subjects all anticompetitive agree-
ments to strict scrutiny.' 35 Second, the act prohibits specific abusive
practices.' 36 Ocean liners are common carriers and as such are expected
to offer their services on a fair and equal basis. The Celler Report stated
that U.S. maritime policy has insisted on "fair play and equal treatment
for shippers large and small [and] protection of cargo and ports against
unfair discrimination."' 37 Major prohibitory provisions of the Act,
therefore, proscribe discriminatory conduct.' 38 The requirement that
conferences file tariffs and adhere strictly to their terms, ' 39 for example,
protects less knowledgeable or less influential shippers from unequal
rates or services.
"Fighting ships," 4° a classic example of predation,' 4 ' have been pro-
129. Sit F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
174 (2d ed. 1980). F. M. Scherer defines rationalization as "integrated planning of production" and
describes a rationalization cartel as "[t]he ultimate in overt agreement, short of merging all produ-
cers into a monolithic monopoly..." Id
130. Se id
131. For a discussion of deferred rebates and other tying devices designed to ensure a shipper's
exclusive patronage, see D. MARX, supra note 7, at 55-56.
132. GAO REPORT, .pra note 65, at 4-5.
133. Agman, supra note 8, at 47.
134. Id
135. See Shipping Act of 1916, ch. 451, § 15, 39 Stat. 728 (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 814
(1982)). For the review standards employed by the FMC, see supra notes 95, 115 & 117-26.
136. 46 U.S.C. §§ 812, 813a, 815, 817 (1982).
137. CELLER REPORT, supra note 106, at 38 1.
138. See 46 U.S.C. §§ 812, 813a-817 (1982).
139. Id § 817.
140. For the definition of figqtg ships, see supra note 88.
141 The congressional aversion to carrier predation is also manifest in the Merchant Marine
Act of 1936, which prohibits the payment of subsidies to American carriers that enter into an
agreement unjustly discriminatory or unfair to another American carrier. Ch. 858, § 810, 49 Stat.
1984]
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hibited since the Act was first enacted in 1916.142 Also, the FMC must
disapprove any tariff rate it finds to be "so unreasonably high or low as
to be detrimental to the commerce of the United States," 143 and carriers
may not raise unremunerative rates without establishing that circum-
stances other than the failure of a competitor justify the increase. 44
Third, the Act places certain restrictions on conference agreements to
ensure a reasonably competitive structure. 145 Section 15 prohibits inter-
conference agreements that do not permit independent action, 146 and it
requires each conference to remain "open."' 147  "Open" conferences
must allow all qualified carriers to join on equal terms.1 48 Proponents of
open conferences claim that free access will prevent unchecked anticom-
petitive conference behavior. 149 A profit-maximizing or closed confer-
ence, they argue, will remove any incentive to develop new
transportation technologies or incorporate other cost-reducing meas-
ures. 15° Conference members, on the other hand, argue that open U.S.
conferences naturally are prone to overtonnaging and, therefore, are un-
able to achieve the efficiencies of fully rationalized services.' 5'
Any reform on ocean shipping regulatory legislation must be consid-
ered against this many-pronged format and the inherent tension it gen-
erates in an industry traditionally hostile to competition. Congress
could advance one of the three legislative prerogatives: 1) abandon its
commitment to competition, leaving the industry to self-regulated ship-
ping cartels; 2) subject ocean common carriers to the competitive regime
generally controlling the U.S. economy; or 3) continue a regulatory
structure that attempts to mediate between the conflicting goals of self-
regulation and competition. Most reform efforts to date have advocated
2015 (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. § 1227 (982)). The courts have interpreted this provision
to require the termination of subsidy payments, as well as the recovery of those already paid, when
subsidized American liner firms engage in acts of predation intended to injure a U.S. carrier. See
Safir v. Gibson, 417 F.2d 972, 977 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); Safir v. Klutznick,
526 F. Supp. 921, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
142. Shipping Act, 1916, ch. 451, § 14(2), 39 Stat. 733 (1916) (current version at 46 U.S.C.
§ 812(2) (1982)). The Celler Report found that the Act had not eliminated "fighting committees."
CELLER REPORT, supra note 106, at 385.
143. 46 U.S.C. § 817(b)(5) (1982).
144. Id § 818.
145. Id. §§ 813a, 814, 817.
146. Id Agreements between carriers in different trades must provide each carrier with a right
of independent action and each conference must retain its independence in interconference agree-
ments. Id
147. Id The prohibition against closed conferences is uniquely American. See Schmeltzer &
Weiner, supra note 52, at 30.
148. 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1982).
149. See Schmeltzer & Weiner, supra note 52, at 28.
150. Id. at 31.
151 Id at 26.
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strengthened cartels with limited regulatory oversight.' 52
II RATIONALE FOR REGULATORY REFORM
Several articulated motives might have propelled the reform efforts in
the shipping industry. Most significant is the perceived need to bolster a
seriously depressed industry. 53 Also, a healthier U.S. merchant marine
would promote U.S. foreign trade, 54 help to improve U.S. balance of
payments, 55 and provide for the needs of the military during emergen-
cies. '56 The several bills that have been considered by recent Congresses
attempt to achieve the goal of a healthy fleet by removing many anti-
trust and regulatory constraints from the liner industry. 57 Proponents
of this change argue that the current regulatory standards are vague, 58
incompatible with efficiency-promoting combinations, 59 inconsistent
with and frequently antagonistic to the policies of other nations, 60 and
applied discriminatorily to the detriment of U.S. carriers.' 6 '
The regulatory reformation contemplated for the industry - one
152. See, e.g., S. 1593, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); S. 125, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981); S. 2585,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H.R. 6899, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
153. See, Maritime Antitrust Oversight Hearings, supra note 49, at 133 (statement of Albert E. May,
Executive Vice President, Council of Flag-Ship Operators); Subcomm. on Merchant Marine of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Sience, and Transportation: Hearings on S 1593 andS 12, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 311-
12 (1981) (statement of Peter Luciano, Executive Director, Transportation Institute) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings on S 1593 and S 125]; Hearings on HR. 6899, supra note 99, at 103 (statement of
Charles I. Hiltzheimer, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Sea-Land Industries Investments,
Inc.); Subcomm. on Merchant Marine of the House .Comm on Merchant Marine and Fisheries: Hearings on ZR.
/11422, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 80 (1978) (statement of Robert Brennan, Executive Vice President,
Lykes Bros. Steamship Company, .Inc.) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 1122].
154. Maritime Anttust Oversight Hearngs, supra note 49, at 140-41 (statement of Peter M. Klein,
Vice President and General Counsel, Sea-Land Industries Investments, Inc.); Hearings on HR. 6899,
supra note 99, at 45-46 (statement of Rep. John M. Murphy); Agman, supra note 8, at 39.
155. Hearigs on H'.R. 4769 Before the Subconm. on Merchant Marine of the House Comm. on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (1979) (testimony of Hon. Richard J. Daschback).
156. Maritime Antitrust Oversight Hearings, supra note 49, at 133-34 (statement of Albert E. May,
Executive Vice President, Council of American Flag-Ship Operators); id at 140 (statement of Peter
M. Klein, Vice President and General Counsel, Sea-Land Industries Investments, Inc.).
157. S. REP. No. 3, supra note 44, at 18-19; H.R. REP. No. 611,supra note 4, at 14-15.
158. Maritime 4nttrust Oversight Hearings, supra note 49, at 139 (statement of Peter M. Klein,
Vice President and General Counsel, Sea-Land Industries Investments, Inc.).
159. Id. at 133 (statement of Albert E. May, Executive Vice President, Council of American
Flag-Ship Operators); id at 143 (statement of Peter M. Klein, Vice President and General Counsel,
Sea-Land Industries Investments, Inc.); see Hearings on S 1593 and S 125, supra note 153, at 312
(statement of Peter Luciano, Executive Director, Transportation Institute).
160. .tlarttime Antitrust Oversight Hearings, supra note 49, at 133-34 (statement of Albert E. May,
Executive Vice President, Council of American Flag-Ship Operators); Hearings on HR. 6899, supra
note 99, at 48 (statement of Rep. Paul N. McCloskey, Jr.).
161 Aaritime Antitrust Oversight Hearings, supra note 49, at 133-34 (statement of Albert E. May,
Executive Vice President, Council of American Flag-Ship Operators); Hearings on H.R. 1/422, supra
note 153, at 81 (statement of Robert Brennan, Executive Vice President, Lykes Bros. Steamship
Company, Inc.).
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which represents a substantial commitment to the benefits of cartels -
is alien to the basic economic ethos of the United States and contrary to
the prevailing efforts to deregulate U.S. industry. 16 2 Because the pro-
posed reformation rejects the fundamental U.S. commitment to the
value of a free-enterprise system, its justification must be closely scruti-
nized and the likely impact of its application clearly understood.
A. Economic Health of the US Liner Indust
The primary motivation for reform of the Shipping Act of 1916 has
been a belief that the U.S. flag merchant fleet is seriously distressed,' 63
as evidenced by the declining numbers of U.S. firms and vessels in the
liner fleet,I 64 and that the current regulatory structure is responsible for
that economic distress.' 65
The General Accounting Office (GAO), in a comprehensive study 166
conducted at the instance of the House Committee on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries, has concluded, however, that the declining numbers of
vessels and companies does not mean that the U.S. industry is seriously
ill. 167 Instead, the study revealed that the technological shift to
container ships has resulted in more efficient liner companies able to
provide faster service with fewer vessels at lower costs. 168 The evolution
of container services, therefore, has produced liner firms that can pro-
vide increased ocean carriage with fewer ships. For example, modern
162. HOUSE REPUBLICAN RESEARCH COMMITTEE TASK FORCE ON CONGRESSIONAL AND
REGULATORY REFORM, REGULATORY REFORM: THE QUIET REVOLUTION II (1983). Maritime
reform legislation is frequently identified as deregulatory, but it lacks the primary characteristic of
other reform efforts. Deregulation of trucking, railroads, airlines and communications, for example,
has represented a commitment to competitive market forces (i.e., the principles of the antitrust
laws) while the proposed maritime legislation is antagonistic to those principles. See id. at 11-12.
163. See sup'a note 153 and accompanying text.
164. Mantime Antitnst Overstght Hearings, supra note 49, at 133 (statement of Albert E. May,
Executive Vice President, Council of American Flag-Ship Operators); GAO REPORT, Supra note 65,
at I1. This article will not discuss the state of the non-liner fleet because the Shipping Act does not
relate to that portion of the U.S. merchant marine.
165. See, e.g., Letter from the Hon. Walter B. Jones, Chairman, House Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, to the Editor of the Washington Post, Wash. Post, July 27, 1982 at
A14, col. 4; Letter from the Hon. Alan Green,Jr., Chairman, Fed. Maritime Comm'n, to the Editor
of the Washington Post, Wash. Post,July 27, 1982 at A14, col. 5; Letter from the Hon. H. E. Shear,
Maritime Adm'r, U.S. Dep't of Transportation, to the Editor of the Washington Post, Wash. Post,
July 27, 1982 at A14, col. 5. Regulatory reform legislation for the shipping industry pending dur-
ing the 97th Congress generated negative editorials by three major newspapers. Set Torpedo the
Maritime BilLr, Wall St. J., July 15, 1982, at 30, col. I (but see response, Wall St. J., July 27, 1982, at
31, col. I and July 29, 1982, at 19, col. 1); Beware the Cargo Ship Cartel, N.Y. Times, July 14, 1982, at
A22, col. I (bid see responses, N.Y. Times, July 27, 1982, at A22, col. 3); The Healthy Fleet, Wash.
Post, July 12, 1982, at A14, col. 1.
166. GAO REPORT, supra note 65.
167 Id. at II.
168. Id. at 11-12.
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container vessels are estimated to carry three to five times the cargo of
conventional freighters. 169 As in other industries, market forces are not
gentle with companies that have failed to seize the benefits of an effi-
ciency-generating technological breakthrough. The GAO found that
shipping firms that have recently failed either lacked the capital to de-
velop container ships, adopted the wrong type of container technology
for the trades served, or made managerial decisions to commit their cap-
ital to other, perhaps more certain, uses.' 70 The widespread container-
ization of liner services has created unprecedented scale economies, and
"in the future, successful liner companies may be those that are larger,
multi-route operations."''7 The picture, therefore, is not one of a dis-
tressed industry but one of an industry adjusting to innovation. The
failure of some to make the adjustment is not evidence of a sick fleet.
The economic performance of liner companies also demonstrates that
there are efficient, highly profitable firms as well as the highly visible,
unsuccessful ones. In 1980, for example, return on equity among ship-
ping firms ranged from a high of 35.8% to a low of negative 193.9%.172
The GAO found that "some major U.S. flag liner operators have had
consistently and substantially hikher than average rates of return on eq-
uity and assets during the 1976-80 period, while other operators have
shown consistently and substantially /ower than average rates of return
"173
Other evidence suggests that several U.S. liner companies are highly
competitive. Since U.S. flag carriers have been required to operate
U.S.-built ships with domestic crews,' 74 they have experienced higher
labor costs than most foreign competitors. 75 As a result, Congress en-
acted the Merchant Marine Act of 1936176 to provide direct construc-
tion and operating subsidies to place U.S. carriers at parity with foreign
carriers. 77 In recent years, however, some U.S. carriers have been able
to compete effectively for ocean carriage without operating subsidies.17
Obviously these carriers have achieved impressive cost-saving efficien-
169. I. HEINE, supra note 24, at 61.
170. GAO REPORT, supra note 65, at 16.
171. Id
172. Id. at 67.
173. Id.
174. I. HEINE, supra note 24, at 6. Section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 spelled out
in detail that operations in the U.S. coastal, intercoastal, and noncontiguous trades must be re-
served for U.S.-built ships manned by U.S. citizens. Id
175. Id
176. Ch. 858, 49 Stat. 1985 (current version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1294 (1982)).
177. I. HEINE, supra note 24, at 10.
178. See id. at 54-56. United States Lines has abandoned its operating subsidy and Sea-Land
Services, Inc. has not applied for one. Id
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cies to compete effectively with foreign liners in spite of substantially
higher labor costs.
Since technological advances have dictated a liner fleet of fewer but
larger firms, 179 and evidence demonstrates that some firms have cap-
tured the benefits of this new order, 180 no likely advantage would be
gained by interfering with the natural adjustment process brought on by
market forces. A prominent transportation economist, Clinton White-
hurst, has aptly noted:
We must shake out the U.S. transportation system in general ....
[W]e have too many firms and too much right-of-way. There are go-
ing to be losers - there is no way around it. I strongly believe that we
cannot do anything about this and that we should not . . . . Actu-
ally, loss is just the other side of the profit coin. In a free market
economy we cannot talk about one without the other.18 '
Advocates of strong shipping cartels, however, tend to equate the eco-
nomic health of individual carriers with that of the industry as a
whole.1 8 2 The exploitation of new and innovative technologies and serv-
ices by individual firms to capture market share - a virtue in a free
market economy - is treated as a vice by advocates of cartels in this
industry.'8 3 The rapid adoption of container technology by innovative
U.S. firms,18 4 for example, has been identified by one writer as the "best
example of the problems . . .caused by [U.S.] law."' 18 5 Congress should
examine thoroughly this alien economic view before it eliminates the
"problems" of innovation and competition in an industry so vital to the
United States' position as an international trader.
The present status of the U.S. fleet' 8 6 suggests that this may be a par-
ticularly opportune time to foster a more competitive industry. United
States liner companies are at the forefront of the container revolution, 187
and since 1979 the United States has had the largest container ship ca-
pacity in the world.Ia This trend appears to give the U.S. liner fleet an
advantage in a more, rather than less, competitive regime than exists
today. A policy that fosters a more extensive use of agreements .not to
compete between U.S. and foreign liner firms seems particularly inap-
179. See supra text accompanying note 168.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 172-78.
181. FORMING MULTIMODAL TRANSPORTATION COMPANIES, BARRIERS, BENEFITS, AND
PROBLEMS 63 (C. Whitehurst ed. 1978).
182. Se Agman, supra note 8, at 27.
183. Se id. at 26-27.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 168-71.
185. Agman, supra note 8, at 27 (emphasis added).
186. See supra text accompanying notes 163-78.
187. GAO REPORT, supra note 65, at 12.
188. Id at 13-14.
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propriate under these circumstances. It is an expensive and questiona-
ble way to attempt to salvage those U.S. firms that may be destined to
fail in any case because they have lacked needed capital or suffered from
poor management. 89
B. Vague Regulaory Standards
Several congressional committees have concluded that the present
regulatory standards are too vague. 190 The Senate Committee on Com-
merce, Science, and Transportation, for example, reported that "vague
standards such as the 'public interest' or 'detriment to the commerce'
tests must be eliminated in order to bring predictability to what has
been an unruly regulatory process."' 9 ' Accordingly, the currently pro-
posed legislation would remove from the Act these tests, found respec-
tively in sections 15192 and l4b193 of the Shipping Act, together with the
"unjustly discriminatory" standard of section 14b,' 94 as standards for
FMC approval of conference agreements. 95
The magnitude of uncertainty under the Shipping Act is often greatly
exaggerated. The standards, for approval of agreements under section
15 are not precise, nor is the outcome predictable in every application.
Nevertheless, the statute's language, its legislative history, 1' and deci-
sional precedents, give the section meaning and direction. One analyst,
for example, has noted that "although the exact meanings of [the stan-
dards] are unclear (because none of them is defined), one is left in no
doubt as to their general purport.' 9 7 The FMC must protect the pub-
lic against monopolistic abuses by ocean liner firms while allowing the
firms to gain the benefits of cooperation and rationalization.
Congress has been most concerned about the perceived uncertain ap-
plication of U.S. antitrust laws to concerted conduct subject to Shipping
Act regulation. '9 There are two aspects to this uncertainty. First, those
189. See supra text accompanying note 170.
190. Se, e.g., S. REP. No. 3, supra note 44, at 27; H.R. REP. No. 611, supra note 4, at 30-31.
191. S. REP. No. 3, supra note 44, at 27.
192. 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1982). Section 814 is reprinted in pertinent part supra note 94.
193 Id § 813a (1982). Section 813a is reprinted in pertinent part supra note 104.
194. Id.
195. See supra note 2. The 1984Act repeals § 14b of the Shipping Act of 3916. Shipping Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-237, § 20(a), 98 Stat. 67, 88 (repealing 46 U.S.C. § 813a). Section 15 is
amended so as to apply only to common carriers by water in interstate commerce and not to all com-
mon carriers by water. Id § 20(b), 98 Stat. at 89. This amendment removes ocean liner confer-
ences from the purview of § 15.
196. S. REP. No. 860, 87th Cong., Ist Sess., reprnted i7 1961 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3108-43.
197. R. Goss, supra note 41, at 23.
198. See S. REP. No. 3, supra note 44, at 3-9.
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subject to the act cannot be certain that the FMC will approve an an-
ticompetitive agreement.'9 Second, the extent of the antitrust immu-
nity provided by the act after FMC approval is indefinite.2 °0  Carriers
that complain about their inability to predict the outcome of FMC de-
terminations necessarily must minimize the value of the protection that
liners enjoy against antitrust prosecution. Conferences, and others sub-
ject to the Shipping Act, receive an exemption from the antitrust laws
for all fully disclosed and approved agreements. 20 1 Such exemption pro-
vides a degree of certainty that few other industries, foreign or domestic,
enjoy.20 2 The standard for approval from an antitrust perspective is also
reasonably clear. Proponents of anticompetitive agreements generally
must establish that the benefits outweigh the potential detriment to U.S.
commerce. 20 3 If one ignores for the moment any international implica-
tions of this policy, the standard is so obviously reasonable in a society
fundamentally committed to the benefits of a free-enterprise system that
the call for its elimination in the name of clarity is radical.
Short of congressional omniscience, any regulatory standard written
by Congress to provide absolute predictability necessarily will impair
the efficiency of carriers or compromise the interests of their competitors
and customers.20 4 A prime benefit of a specialized regulatory body is,
after all, its ability to apply specific facts to a general standard and to
enforce its mandate with a sensitivity grown out of accumulated exper-
tise. Carriers are entitled to reasonably swift, consistent, and reasoned
decisions by the FMC regarding the approval or disapproval of agree-
ments filed under section 15, and any statutory or regulatory changes
that foster that end would be salutary. Eliminating or minimizing over-
sight as a condition of antitrust immunity to promote certainty may
expose U.S. shippers and consumers to the substantial risk of price in-
creases caused by either needless inefficiency or monopolistic
overreaching.
The second aspect - concern over the extent of antitrust immunity
- is more problematic. In those instances where conferences and their
199. HR. 6899 Hearings, supra note 99, at 93 (statement of Robert J. Blackwell on behalf of the
Council of American-Flag Ship Operators).
200. HOUSE COMM. ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL
OCEAN COMMERCE TRANSPORTATION, H.R. REP. No. 53, part I, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1983).
201. 46 U.S.C. § 833a (1982).
202. An example of another industry having a preclearance process is the export trading com-
pany industry. Export trading companies may determine in advance whether certain of their ex-
port trade activities are exempt from U.S. antitrust law. Export Trading Company Act §§ 301-312,
12 U.S.C. §§ 4011-4021 (1982).
203. See supra text accompanying notes 117-26.
204. See Maritime Antitrst Oversight Hearings, supra note 49, at 88-89, 132 (testimony of Thomas
J. Campbell, Director, Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade Comm'n).
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members have been subjected to antitrust liability, there seems to be
little doubt that the illegal conduct was knowingly beyond the terms of
an approved agreement. In the 1979 North Atlantic Contai'ner 2°5 case, a
federal grand jury indicted seven North Atlantic liner firms for criminal
antitrust violations.23 6 The defendants allegedly had fixed rates pursu-
ant to agreements that never were filed with or approved by the FMC
and that contained provisions specifically prohibited by the Shipping
Act. 207 Under such circumstances, any purported surprise of defendants
that they could be subjected to antitrust prosecution would merit little
attention.
In an action before the FMC involving similar facts, Rates on U.S Gov-
emnment Cargoes, 2 concerted carrier predatory pricing activites were
found responsible for the failure of Sapphire Steamship Lines, Inc., an
independent liner. Sapphire was formed primarily to provide container-
ized transport for the household goods of military personnel at a sub-
stantially lower rate than was then available.2°9 Other carriers and
conferences transporting these goods, mainly the Atlantic and Gulf
American Flag Berth Operators (AGAFBO), responded to this new
competition by lowering their rates to noncompensatory levels 210 and by
pressuring van lines to prevent their cooperation with Sapphire.2t'
Once Sapphire's economic ruin was assured, the conference rates were
raised. 212 The FMC found that the conference conduct was predatory
and therefore in violation of section 15.213 The separate opinion of
Chairman Harllee and Commissioner Barrett describes the conference
activity in strong condemnatory language:
The various AGAFBO activities lead to but one conclusion, that the
carriers agreed to take whatever steps were necessary to drive Sap-
phire from the trade. The cumulative effect of all of these acts was
decidedly one to destroy competition; that is, to end the threat of Sap-
phire and preserve the monopoly of AGAFBO. This concerted under-
205. United States v. North Atlantic Container Une, No. 79- 00271, slip op. (D.D.C. June 1,
1979), reprinted in Maritine Antitust Oversight Hean'gs, supra note 49, at 204. The agreements charged
in the indictment went beyond the permitted geographic scope of all approved agreements and
included understanding between members of different conferences that they would not exercise
their right of independent action. Id This latter understanding is explicitly prohibited by section
15. See 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1982).
206. United States v. North Atlantic Container Une, No. 79-00271, slip op., at I (D.D.C. June
I, 1979).
207. I. at 15-17.
208. 11 F.M.C. 263 (1967).
209. Id. at 270-71.
210. Id at 282.
211. Id at 272-74.
212. Id at 275; see a/so Safir v. Gibson, 417 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1969), cert, drned, 400 U.S.
850 (1970).
213. Rates on U.S. Government Cargoes, II F.M.C. 263, 283 (1967)
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taking amounted to a new scheme of rate combination and
discrimination not embodied in the AGAFBO agreement. Thus,
there was no section 15 authorization for such conduct.2 1 4
Conceptually, however, carriers face a grey area of potential liability
when arguably acting within the scope of an approved agreement. In
Sabre Shipping Corp. v. Amen'can President Li'nes, 2 15 the court held that ap-
proval by the FMC under section 15 extends antitrust immunity only to
activities that are otherwise lawful. 21 6 The establishment of predatory
rates in violation of section 18(b)(5) of the Shipping Act 2 17 was held to
be beyond the antitrust exemption provided by defendants' approved
rate-making agreement. 218
Although the Sabre Sh'pping case interjects some uncertainty regarding
the scope of the protection against antitrust liability that section 15 ap-
proval provides conferences, that decision, along with North Atlantic
Container and Rates on US Government Cargoes, suggests that antitrust ex-
posure is, on the whole, limited to egregious behavior that reasonable
persons should have anticipated to be beyond the scope of an approved
agreement. Although it may have some conceptual basis, a carrier's de-
fense of surprise, when faced with antitrust exposure, does not seem rea-
sonable given the controlling standards for exemption and the facts of
the prominent cases.
Moreover, assuming that predictability is a compelling virtue, the
proposed amendments to the Shipping Act would produce no greater
certainty than now exists. They would replace the "public interest" and
related standards, which embody an antitrust element, with a lengthy
list of prohibited acts.2 1 9 The list, however, is replete with activities that
are only proscribed if "unjust" or " unreasonable. 2 2 0 Section 12(d)(2)
of the Senate bill provides a striking example. It states that common
carriers, freight forwarders, and terminal operators may not
make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any
particular person, locality, or description of traffic in any respect
whatsoever, or subject any particular person, locality, or description
of traffic to an unreasonable refusal to deal or any undue or unreasonable
214. Id at 289.
215. 285 F. Supp. 949 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 922 (1969).
216. Id at 954-55.
217. 46 U.S.C. § 817(b)(5) (1982). Section 18(b)(5) requires the FMC to disapprove rates that
are "so unreasonably high or low as to be detrimental to the commerce of the United States." Id
218. 285 F. Supp. at 954-55.
219. Eg., S. 47,supra note 2, § 12. The 1984 Act, as well, contains a long list of prohibited acts.
Shipping Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-237, § 10, 98 Stat. 67, 77-80 (to be codified at 46 U.S.C. app.
§ 1709).
220. E.g., S. 47, supra note 2, § 12. The 1984 Act includes similar indefinite terms. Eg., Ship-
ping Act of 1984, § 10(b)(6), 98 Stat. at 78 (to be codified at 46 U.S.C app. § 1709(b)(6)).
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prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever.22'
To the extent that statutory uncertainty has driven the move for reform,
the various proposals for change do not adequately address this
problem.
There is also inevitable tension between section 3 of the proposed leg-
islation, identifying presumptively permissible anticompetitive acts, 222
and section 9, identifying expressly prohibited acts.2 23 Carriers may, for
example, agree to "engage in exclusive, preferential, or cooperative
working arrangements among themselves or with . . . marine terminal
221. S. 47, supra note 2, § 12(d)(2) (emphasis added).
222. Id § 4; S. 47 (House Version), supra note 2, § 3. The list of presumptively permissible
activities indicates that common carriers, for example, may
(I) discuss, fix, or regulate transportation rates, including through rates, cargo space ac-
commodations, and other conditions of services; (2) pool or apportion traffic, revenues
earnings or losses; (3) allot ports or restrict or otherwise regulate the number and charac-
ter of sailings between ports; (4) limit or regulate the volume or character of cargo or
passenger traffic to be carried; (5) engage in exclusive, preferential, or cooperative working
arrangements among themselves or with one or more marine terminal operators or
nonvessel-operating common carriers; and (6) control, regulate, or prevent competition
among themselves.
S. 47 (House Version), supra note 2, § 3(a).
223. S. 47, rupra note 2, § 12; S. 47 (House Version), supra note 2, § 9. The section of prohib-
ited acts states; in part, as follows:
(a) IN GENERAL - No person may -
(1 knowingly and willfully, directly or indirectly, by means of false billing, false classi-
fication, false weighing, false report of weight, false measurement, or by any other unjust
or unfair device or means obtain or attempt to obtain ocean transportation for property at
less than the rates or charges that would otherwise be applicable;
(2) operate under an agreement required to be filed under section 4 that has not be-
come effective under section 5, or that has been rejected, disapproved, or cancelled; or
(3) operate under an agreement required to be filed under section 4 except in accord-
ance with any modifications made by the Commission to the agreement.
(b) COMMON CARRIERS - No common carrier, either alone or in conjunction with
any other person, directly or indirectly, may -
(1) charge, demand, collect, or receive greater, less, or different compensation for the
transportation of property or for any service in connection therewith [from] the rates and
charges that are specified in its tariffs;
(2) rebate, refund, or remit in any manner, or by any device, any portion of its rates
except in accordance with the tariffs;
(3) extend or deny to any person any privilege, concession, equipment, or facility ex-
cept in accordance with its tariffs;
(4) allow any person to obtain transportation for property at less than the rates or
charges established by the carrier in its tariff by means of false billing, false classification,
false weighing, false measurement, or by any other unjust or unfair device or means;
(5) retaliate against any shipper by refusing, or threatening to refuse, cargo space ac-
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operators or non-vessel-operating common carriers, "224 but they are pro-
hibited from giving "any undue or unreasonable preference or advan-
tage to any particular person, locality, or description of traffic in any
respect whatsoever. 22 5 The only certainty provided by the legislation is
that the burden of proving a violation is with the injured party.2 26
commodations, or resort to other unfair or unjustly discriminatory methods because the
shipper has patronized another carrier, or has filed-a complaint, or for any other reason;
(6) engage in any unfair or unjustly discriminatory practice in the matter of -
(A) rates;
(B) cargo classifications;
(C) cargo space accomodations or other facilities, due regard being had for the
proper loading of the vessel and the available tonnage;
(D) the loading and landing of freight in proper condition; or
(E) the adjustment and settlement of claims;
(7) employ any fighting ship;
(8) offer or pay any deferred rebates;
(9) use a royalty contract, except in conformity with the antitrust laws;
(10) demand, charge, or collect any rate or charge that is unjustly discriminatory be-
tween shippers or ports;
(11) make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particu-
lar person, locality, or description of traffic in any respect whatsoever, or subject any
particular person, locality, or description of traffic to an unreasonable refusal to deal or
any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever; or
(12) knowingly disclose, offer, solicit, or receive any information concerning the nature,
kind, quantity, destination, consignee, or routing of any property tendered or delivered to
a common carrier without the consent of the shipper or consignee ....
(c) CONCERTED ACTION - No conference or group of two or more common carriers
may -
(1) boycott or take any other concerted action resulting in an unreasonable refusal to
deal;
(2) engage in conduct that unreasonably conditions or otherwise unreasonably restricts
the ability of a shipper to select a common carrier in a competing trade, an ocean tramp,
or a bulk carrier;
(3) engage in conduct that discourages the use of intermodal services or technological
innovations by member carriers;
(4) engage in any predatory practice designed to eliminate the participation, or deny
the entry, in a particular trade of a common carrier not a member of the conference, a
group of common carriers, an ocean tramp, or a bulk carrier;
(5) negotiate with a nonocean carrier or group of nonocean carriers . on any matter
relating to rates or services provided to ocean common carriers within the United States
by those nonocean carriers: PrAvided, That this paragraph does not prohibit the setting and
publishing of a joint through rate by a conference, joint service, or an association of ocean
common carriers;
(6) except as otherwise required by the law of the United States or the importing or
exporting country, or as agreed to by a shipper in a service contract, allocate shippers
among specific carriers that are parties to the agreement or prohibit a carrier that is a
party of the agreement from soliciting cargo from a particular shipper.
S. 47 (House Version), .upra note 2, § 9(a)-(c). The Shipping Act of 1984 maintains this tension
since it incorporates lists of both permissible anticompetitive acts, § 7, 98 Stat. at 73-74 (to be
codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 1706), and expressly prohibited acts, § 10, 98 Stat. at 77-80 (to be
codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 1709).
224. S. 47 (House Version), supra note 2, § 3(5).
225. Id., §9(b)(11).
226. S. 47, supra note 2, § 6(e). The current House version of S. 47 does not have a provision
expressly designating which party carries the burden of proof. The 1984 Act places the burden of
proof on the Commission in suits to enjoin operation of an agreement. § 6(h), 98 Stat. at 73 (to be
codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 1705(h)).
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Much of the legislative history of the proposed amendments to the
Shipping Act will exacerbate the indefinite application of the law. The
House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, for example,
identifies the oversight role of the FMC in two potential ly inconsistent
ways. First, the committee states that the FMC may modify or cancel
an agreement "only if prohibited conduct is demonstrated to be the logi-
cal result of an agreement's implementation. 22 7 Later, the committee
notes that "the basis for changing the terms of an agreement shall be
measured only by specific conduct; the FMC may not take such action
based on anticipated or speculative wrongs that may be derived from an
analysis of the agreement itself."228 Reconciliation of this and related
issues will require potentially complex and costly litigation, placing a
heavy burden on the victims of anticompetitive agreements.
In summation, both the uncertainty of existing law and the clarity of
the proposed amendments are exaggerated by those advocating change.
The fear of unexpected and unjustified antitrust exposure, although
having some theoretical basis, is largely unjustified in fact. Further-
more, rather than eliminate vague standards, the amendments merely
shift the problems caused by indefinite standards to those objecting to
the impact of anticompetitive agreements.
C. Eicieny-Promoting Combinations
Albert E. May, testifying on behalf of the Council of American-Flag
Ship Operators in 1982, stated:
U.S.-flag carriers are generally unable to merge or otherwise organize
shipping enterprises to minimize investment risk and maximize fi-
nancing stability.
U.S.-flag carriers are, as a consequence, less able to attain the effi-
ciencies of scale so significant in our high fixed cost industry. Thus,
we are not fully competitive on a cost basis with the rationalized con-
sortia with which we must compete for cargoes.229
Neither the current Shipping Act nor the proposed amendments deal
meaningfully with the merger issue raised by Mr. May.230 Because
mergers between common carriers are not subject to section 15,231 the
FMC has no authority to approve such transactions. 232
In Amencan Mail Line, Ltd v. Federal Mariine Commision, 23 3 the Court
227. H.R. REP. No. 53, supra note 200, at 4.
228. Id at 11-12.
229. Martir Antitrust Oversight Hearngs, supra note 49, at 133.
230. The 1984 Act is similarly without meaningful provision on this merger issue.
231. See 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1982).
232. See Fed. Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, 411 U.S. 726 (1972); United States v. R. J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 325 F. Supp. 656, 661-63 (D.N.J. 1971), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 964 (1973).
233. 503 F.2d 157 (D.C. Cir.),cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974).
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of Appeals for the District of Columbia vacated a Commission decision
approving an agreement that would have placed the world's two largest
containership companies under the control of a single corporate par-
ent.2 34 The court found that a principal feature of the transaction was
in fact a merger of two containership fleets. 235 The court held that even
though section 15 was enacted in part to allow common carriers to enter
into on-going cooperative agreements, an agreement involving an out-
right merger or acquisition is beyond the scope of the Shipping Act.
236
Thus, the FMC has no jurisdiction over Clayton Act violations. The
proposed legislation maintains this posture.
2 37
The Clayton Act, however, need not prevent the types of mergers that
Mr. May suggests are desirable. An efficiency-promoting merger that
would not unduly concentrate the liner industry may well survive a
Clayton Act challenge. 2-" Further, since existing U.S. liner firms are
experiencing serious financial problems,2 39 the failing-company defense
may be appropriately invoked. 24° United States merger law is, there-
fore, not an absolute barrier to the consolidation of ocean common car-
riers, and to the extent that predictability is desirable, the pre-merger
notification requirement of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act 24' provides for
Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission review prior to con-
summation of a merger.
Consolidations that fall short of a merger, such as joint ventures, con-
sortia, pooling agreements and various other contractual agreements,
are more problematic under the Clayton Act and the Shipping Act.
Professor Areeda states that the concept of a joint venture lacks "definite
meaning or antitrust consequence. '242 Joint ventures have been treated
234. Id at 171. The agreement would have made United States Lines a wholly owned subsidi-
ary of R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, while Reynolds already controlled Sea-Land Services,
Inc. 1d. at 159.
235. Id at 166-67.
236. Id at 162-66.
237. Se S. 47, supra note 2, § 4(c); S. 47 (House Version), supra note 2, § 3(c). Sectioin 4(c) of
the 1984 Act expressly removes acquisitions of voting securities or assets from the purview of the
Act. Shipping Act of 1984, § 4(c), 98 Stat. at 70 (to be codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 1703(c)).
238. Although a thorough analysis of merger law and policy is beyond the scope of this article,
the reader should consult U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., Merger Guidelines, 47 Fed. Reg.
28,493 (1982); Fed. Trade Comm'n, Policy Statement on Horizontal Mergers, reprinted in special
supplement, 42 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1069, at 5-12 (June 17, 1982); Symposium.
1982 Merger Cuidhs, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 280 (1983).
239. See GAO REPORT, supra note 65, at 58. In its response to the GAO findings, the Depart-
ment of Transportation stated that three of the existing nine U.S. liner firms have serious financial
problems. Id.
240. For discussions of the failing company defense, see Citizens Publishing Co. v. United
States, 394 U.S. 131, 136-139 (1969); L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 628-30 (1977).
241. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1982)
242. P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 360 (3d ed., 1981).
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as mergers, subject to scrutiny under section 7 of the Clayton Act 2 43 and
as combinations that may violate section 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act. 244
This uncertainty under the antitrust laws has implications for Shipping
Act enforcement. While the FMC may exempt carrier agreements from
the antitrust laws generally, it may not approve a merger subject to sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act. 245
Despite this apparent ambiguity, the FMC has approved joint ven-
tures. It defines a "joint service agreement," which is subject to FMC
approval, as "[a]n agreement which establishes a new and separate line
or service to be operated by the parties as a joint venture. The new and
separate service fixes its own rates, publishes its own tariffs, issues its own
bills of lading, and acts generally as a single carrier. 2 46  If, as propo-
nents of change contend, 247 the FMC will not approve joint service or
consortia agreements between U.S. firms that will achieve desirable
scale economies, or that are required to obtain needed capital, the prob-
lem is one of enforcement and not one mandated by existing law.
The Svenska standard 248 authorizes the FMC to approve an agree-
ment, even if inconsistent with antitrust principles, if the proponents
establish that the agreement would, inter alia, further "a valid regula-
tory purpose of the Shipping Act."' 249 A primary goal of the Shipping
Act is to strengthen the U.S. merchant marine fleet and to prevent it
from coming under the control of foreign interests.2S° If the FMC has
refused to approve joint service agreements among U.S. firms that are
necessary to make the firms internationally competitive, either the par-
ties to those agreements could not or would not demonstrate the need
for the consolidation or the Commission has been untrue to its mandate.
Neither an amendment to the substantive provisions of the existing law
nor changes in the established enforcement standards seem necessary or
warranted under these circumstances.
243 United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
244. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1982); see, e.g., United States v. Pan American World Airways, 193 F.
Supp. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), rev'don other grounds, 371 U.S. 296 (1963). Whether a court will scrutinize
a joint venture under the rule of reason or apply a per se analysis is uncertain. Compare United
States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) with United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S.
596 (1972) and United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950).
245. See supra text accompanying notes 236-37.
246. 46 C.F.R. § 522.2(a)(4) (1982).
247. See, e.g., .4,aritme AntItrust Oversght H-earings, supra note 49, at 139 (statement of Peter
Klein, Vice President and General Counsel, Sea-Land Industries Investments, Inc.).
248. See supra text accompanying notes 120-2 1.
249. Investigation of Passenger Steamship Conferences Regarding Travel Agents, 10 F.M.C.
27, 45 (1966).
250. See Chemical Bank New York Trust Co. v. Steamship Westhampton, 358 F.2d 574. 580
14th Cir. 1965), cert. dented, 385 U.S. 921 (1966).
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D. Inconsistency with Foreign Laws and Policies
The United States' tolerance of the conference system is induced pri-
marily by the international nature of ocean shipping. The case for even
less restraint than is imposed currently by the United States is strength-
ened by the perception that the United States' regulatory and antitrust
policies largely are antagonistic to those of the rest of the world.2 5 ' This
perception, however, exaggerates the differences between U.S. and for-
eign competition policies.
The basic competition policies of the European Community, con-
tained in articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome, 252 are consistent in
major respects with fundamental antitrust policies of the United States.
The articles prohibit agreements that restrict trade2 53 and outlaw the
abuse of a firm's dominant market position.2 5 Articles 85 and 86 cur-
251. See S. REP. No. 3, supra note 44, at 7.
252. Treaty of Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, arts. 85-86, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47-49.
253. Id art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S. 47-48. Article 85 of the Treaty provides:
1. The following shall be deemed to be incompatible with the Common Market and shall
hereby be prohibited: any agreements between enterprises, any decisions by associations
of enterprises and any concerted practices which are likely to affect trade between the
Member States and which have as their object or result the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition within the Common Market, in particular those consisting in:
(a) the direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices or of any other trading
conditions;
(b) the limitations or control of production, markets, technical development or
investment;
(c) market-sharing or the sharing of sources of supply;
(d) the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in respect of equivalent
supplies, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; or
(e) the subjecting of the conclusion of a contract to the acceptance by a party of addi-
tional supplies which, either by their nature or according to commercial usage, have
no connection with the subject of such contract.
3. Nevertheless, the provisions of paragraph I may be declared inapplicable in the case of:
- any agreements or classes of agreements between enterprises,
- any decisions or classes of decisions by associations of enterprises, and
- any concerted practices or classes of concerted practices which contribute to the
improvement of the production or distribution of goods or to the promotion of
technical or economic progress while reserving to users an equitable share of the
profit resulting therefrom, and which:
(a) neither impose on the enterprises concerned any restrictions not indispensable
to the attainment of the above objectives;
(b) nor enable such enterprise to eliminate competition in respect of a substantial
proportion of the goods concerned.
Id
254. Id art. 86, 298 U.N.T.S. 48-49. Article 86 of the Treaty provides:
To the extent to which trade between any Member States may be affected thereby, action
by one or more enterprises to take improper advantage of a dominant position within the
Common Market or within a substantial part of it shall be deemed to be incompatible
with the Common Market and shall hereby be prohibited.
Such improper practices may, in particular, consist in:
(a) the direct or indirect imposition of any inequitable purchase or selling prices or of any
other inequitable trading conditions;
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rently apply to the ocean shipping industry, although the Commission
of the European Community - the Community's enforcement arm -
is without authority to enforce the competition rules against ocean carri-
ers. 25 5 Enforcement of the treaty is left to the Community's member
nations, although the Commission may investigate violations by ocean
shipping firms and recommend enforcement actions to the member
countries. 256
The European Community is currently considering rules proposed by
the European Commission that would exempt the ocean shipping indus-
try from articles 85 and 86.257 The proposal was prompted by concern
that the member countries would reach conflicting conclusions regard-
ing conference conduct under articles 85 and 86 - a realistic fear in
light of the several complaints against conferences the Commission has
received. 2m The rules, if adopted, would specify conditions and impose
obligations on carriers seeking to remain eligible for the exemption. 25 9
The exemption would be lost if carriers violated these conditions, and
the Treaty would then be enforced directly by the European Commis-
(b) the limitation of production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of
consumers;
(c) the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in respect of equivalent
supplies, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; or
(d) the subjecting of the conclusion of a contract to the acceptance, by a party, of addi-
tional supplies which, either by their nature or according to commercial usage, have
no connection with the subject of such contract.
255. [(EEC) BI] WORLD L. OF COMPETITION (MB) Pt. I § 2.01 (3)(c) (July 1982).
256. Id In the absence of regulations providing for the enforcement of articles 85 and 86 to the
ocean transport industry, articles 88 and 89 remain applicable. Id Article 88 provides:
Until the date of the entry into force of the provisions adopted in application of Article 87,
the authorities in Member States shall, in accordance with their respective municipal law
and with the provisions of Article 85, particularly paragraph 3, and of Article 86, rule
upon the admissibility of any understanding and upon any improper advantage taken of
a dominant position in the Common Market.
Treaty of Rome, supra note 252, art. 88, 298 U.N.T.S. 49.
Article 89 provides:
I. Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 88, the Commission shall, upon taking
up its duties, ensure the application of the principles laid down in Articles 85 and 86. It
shall, at the request of a Member State or ex oftio, investigate, in conjunction with the
competent authorities of the Member States, which shall lend it their assistance, any al-
leged infringement of the above-mentioned principles. If it finds that such infringement
has taken place, it shall propose appropriate means to bring it to an end. 2. If such in-
fringement continues, the Commission shall, by means of a reasoned decision, confirm the
existence of such infringement of the above-mentioned principles. The Commission may
publish its decision and may authorize Member States to take the necessary measures, of
which it shall determine the conditions and particulars, 'to remedy the situation.
Id. art. 89, 298 U.N.T.S. 49-50.
257. Proposal For a Council Regulation (EEC), Laying Down Detailed Rules for the Applica-
tion of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty to Maintain Transport, COM (81) 423 final, Oct. 13, 1981.
258. Id at 2.
259. Id arts. 4, 5 of proposed regulation.
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sion.26° This history demonstrates that the Community views the ship-
ping industry differently than it does industry in general, but it does not
demonstrate an unqualified commitment to unregulated shipping
conferences.
The response of the United Kingdom to the proposed community rule
regarding ocean shipping is significant. Despite a strong historical com-
mitment to the conference system, the United Kingdom has expressed
serious concern over the possible elimination of nonconference competi-
tion. 26 ' British shippers have argued that loyalty contracts should be
limited to seventy percent of the contract shipper's goods. 262 And, nota-
bly, the British government tentatively has taken the position that pred-
atory conduct aimed at nonconference carriers, as well as the abuse of a
conference's dominant position, should result in revocation of the
exemption. 263
The Canadian government also is reconsidering the role its competi-
tion laws play in the ocean shipping industry. Canada's "Shipping Con-
ferences Exemption Act ' 264 is scheduled, under a sunset provision, to
expire in 1984.265 Unless the Act is renewed, conferences will become
subject to the competition policies of the Combines Investigation Act. 266
To determine if the exemption should be renewed, the Bureau of Com-
petition Policy, Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, sponsored a
survey to reveal how Canadian shippers view shipping conferences. 26 7
Eighty-five percent of the shippers responding were dissatisfied with the
existing exemption. 268 More than forty percent of the respondents fa-
vored outright repeal of the exemption, while another forty percent be-
lieved that a renewed exemption should more effectively control
conference activities. 269 Shippers desiring greater control divided al-
most equally between those wanting more active governmental control
and those wishing to strenghten shippers' councils. 270 This survey, of
course, does not dictate what the Canadian government ultimately will
260. Id at 4.
261. European Shtppers Seek Narrow Exceptions to Stimulate More Competition Among Conferences, 42
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), No. 1059, at 739 (Apr. 8, 1982); see also, Her MaesI s Govern-
ment's Evidence to the Howe of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, draft instrument
10150/81 (Oct. 22, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Her Majesty's Covernmnent's Evidence].
262. Her Majesty's Government's Evidence, supra note 261, at 10.
263. Id at 12.
264. Shipping Conferences Exemption Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. 39, Ist supp. (1970).
265. E.M. LUDWICK & ASSOCIATES, INC., SHIPPING CONFERENCES: SURVEY OF USERS' VIEWS
I (1983).
266. Id The Combines Investigation Act is codified at CAN. REV. STAT. ch. C-23 (1970).
267. E.M. LUDWICK & ASSOCIATES, INC., supra note 265, at 1.
268. Id at Executive Summary.
269. Id
270. Id
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do about the exemption, but it does indicate that there is no uniform
belief in Canada that unregulated conferences will serve the needs of
shippers.
International attitudes toward shipping conferences also are in a state
of transition. The pending implementation of the UNCTAD Code of
Conduct for Liner Conferences, 271 which represents the first interna-
tional system of liner regulation, 27 2 and the growing use of bilateral
agreements 273 are the result of international and national concern about
the practices of shipping conferences.
Although the basic U.S. pro-competition system no longer is unique
to the United States, substantial differences remain between the enforce-
ment policies of the United States and those of much of the rest of the
world. Most notably, liberal U.S. discovery policies and private treble
damage actions have been a major irritant to other nations,27 4 which
occasionally have responded with blocking statutes that prohibit disclo-
sure of documents under certain circumstances and deny the use of their
courts to enforce a foreign civil judgment with a punitive element.275 In
addition to blocking statutes, England has adopted a "claw-back" stat-
ute allowing suits by nationals to recover the punitive portion of any
judgment executed in the United States. 2 76 This foreign hostility to
U.S. antitrust enforcement policies was heightened by the 1979 criminal
prosecution and subsequent treble damage class actions against mem-
bers of the ocean shipping industry,277 but the problem is not limited to
this industry. 278
271. UNCTAD, United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on a Code of Conduct for
Liner Conference, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE/13/Add. 1, Vol. 11 (1975).
.272. Larsen and Vetterick, The UNCTAD Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences: Resention, Reac-
tionis and US Alternatioes, 13 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 223, 223 (1981).
273. Id at 272; see, KEARNEY, MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS, THE IMPACT OF BILATERAL
SHIPPING AGREEMENTS: AN ANALYSIS OF SERVICE, RATES AND SHIPPER RESPONSES 3 (1983);
Lopatin, The UNCTAD Code of Conduct/or Liner Conferences. Tne for a United Slatts Response, 22 HARV.
INT'L L. J. 355, 376-77 (1981).
274. Cira, The Challenge of Foreign Laws to Block American Antitnast Actions, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L.
247 (1982); Pettit and Styles, The International Response to the Extratemitorial Application of United Statle
Antitnst Laws, 37 Bus. LAw. 697 (1982).
275. Eg., Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. II (United Kingdom); Foreign Anti-
trust Judgments (Restriction of Enforcement) Act 1979, Austl. Acts No. 13; Cira, supra note 274, at
248-60. "Over a dozen major shipping nations have now legislated to limit the thrust and applica-
bility of U.S. regulatory and antitrust law. Mariime Antiltrust Oversight Hearings, supra note 49, at 134
(statement of Albert E. May, Executive Vice President, Council of American Flag-Ship Operators).
276. Cira, supra note 274, at 249. One such example of this legislation is the Protection of
Trading Interests Acts, 1980, Ch. II, § 6 (United Kingdom). Canada has proposed legislation that
would reimburse all damages paid by a national in a similar suit. Cira, supra note 274, at 259.
277. Cira, supra note 274, at 251.
278. Id at 249-50. Civil actions against the international uranium cartel were a major precipi-
tating factor leading to adoption of foreign blocking statutes. Id
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Currently, conferences are regulated more extensively by the United
States than by other nations. 279 The proposed amendments retain the
United States in its regulatory role of agreement enforcer.28 0 If consis-
tency with foreign policies is a major goal of the legislation under con-
sideration, legislation allowing largely unregulated conferences to
engage in commercially desirable conduct should be accompanied by
enforcement left to commercial means, a measure more consistent with
international practice.
E. Dtscn'ninatoqi Enforcement
United States carriers argue that foreign blocking and claw-back stat-
utes, 28 ' together with domestic enforcement policies, result in discrimi-
nation against U.S. flag operators. 28 2 They claim that U.S. shipping
regulations and antitrust laws are applied more stringently to their ac-
tivities than to those of foreign carriers.2 3
The available evidence, however, fails to demonstrate that either the
FMC or Justice Department has favored foreign carriers. The GAO, for
example, concluded that the FMC has enforced the Shipping Act even-
handedly. 284 In fact, the GAO found that fewer cases had been brought
against American carriers than would be expected if malpractice and
rebating proceedings bore a direct relationship to the proportion of ton-
nage controlled by Americans.2 5 The Justice Department also has
prosecuted foreign as well as domestic carriers. The 1979 criminal anti-
trust action, United States v. Atlantic Container Line, Ltd, 28 6 for example,
named three foreign liner companies as defendants. 287 These carriers
entered pleas of nolo contendere and paid substantial fines. 288 The Jus-
tice Department likewise has intervened in section 15 proceedings in-
volving agreements primarily among foreign flag carriers. 28 9 The
279. H.R. REP. No. 53, supra note 200, pt. 2, at 24.
280. &Se incfa notes 292-95 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 275-76 and accompanying text.
282. Mantien Antitrust Owrsight Hearings, supra note 49, at 133-34 (statement of Albert E. May,
Executive Vice President, Council of American Flag-Ship Operators).
283. Id
284. GAO REPORT, supra note 65, at 16-17.
285. Id
286. No. 79-00271, slip op. (D.D.C. June 1, 1979), reprinted in Maritme Antitrust Oversight Hear-
ings, supra note 49, at 204.
287. Id at 2-3. The three foreign liner companies named as defendants were Atlantic
Container Line, Ltd., Containerline Company, Ltd., and Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengesellchaft. Id
288. Settlements of About 151.4 milion Approved in Ocean Shipping Litigation, 42 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA), No. 1052, at 370 (Feb. 18, 1982).
289. Ocean Shipping Act of 1983: Heanngs on S 47 Before the Subcomm. on Merchant Marine of the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 62 (1983) (Letter from Alan
Green, Jr., Chairman of the Fed. Maritime Comm'n to Sen. Daniel L. Inouye, (Feb. 9, 1983)).
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antitrust division of the Justice Department naturally may be more con-
cerned about the activities of U.S. firms because they have a more obvi-
ous and immediate impact on U.S. commerce - certain U.S. cargoes
are reserved to U.S. flag carriersm - and enforcement raises little or no
diplomatic concern. Nevertheless, the facts do not support the conten-
tion that U.S. carriers have been the victims of discriminatory enforce-
ment policies by either the Department of Justice or the FMC.
III. POTENTIAL IMPACT OF PROPOSED REGULATORY REFORM
A. Monopolistic Abuse
The proposed changes to the Shipping Act would result in a radical
departure from the traditional role of economic regulatory bodies. In.
industries where competition is believed to be unworkable, regulatory
bodies substitute for market forces, controlling service while attempting
to ensure fair rates.29' The proposed amendments to the Shipping Act
would leave much of this traditional regulatory function to the industry
itself, relegating the FMC largely to the role of enforcing conference
agreements.
The international nature of ocean shipping has resulted in a less asser-
tive regulatory role for the FMC and its predecessors than has been true
in other transportation industries. Most notably, the FMC has lacked
the authority to approve rates generally. 292 The agency's primary re-
sponsibility has been to (1) prevent the establishment of unreasonably
high or low rates,293 (2) review and approve or disapprove anticompeti-
tive agreements,2 4 and (3) enforce the prohibitory provisions of the stat-
ute.295 The proposed changes would eliminate the FMC's authority to
reject conference rates regardless of their level, minimize its ability to
disapprove anticompetitive agreements, and stress its enforcement role.
The FMC would be left with a limited ability to prohibit anticompeti-
tive agreements and prevent their natural consequences.
The reliance of the legislation's sponsors on a list of prohibited acts296
misconstrues the "evil" of monopoly. The list consists largely of devices
to achieve, maintain, or exercise a monopolistic position.297 For exam-
290. I. HEINE, supra note 24, at 11-13.
291. See, L. SCHWARTZ & J. FLYNN, ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES 687-691
(5th ed. 1977).
292. D. MARX, supra. note 7, at 119-20, 290.
293. See 46 U.S.C. § 817(b)(5) (1982).
294. Seezid § 814.
295. , id §§ 812-813, 815-816.
296. S. 47, supra note 2, § 12; S. 47 (House version), supra note 2, at § 9. Section 9 is reprinted
in part supra note 223.
297. See supra note 223.
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pie, fighting ships and other forms of predation destroy competitors; ty-
ing and preferential agreements with shippers and ports foreclose
markets to other carriers; and discrimination maximizes monopolistic
returns. While prohibiting many of these practices, the proposed
changes to the Shipping Act would not necessarily prevent the ultimate
vices of monopoly: higher prices and limited service. The legislation not
only would eliminate the FMC's authority to disapprove monopolistic
rates, it also would compel the Commission to enforce tariffs containing
such rates. Alfred Kahn, former chairman of the Civil Aeronautics
Board and of the President's Council of Economic Advisors, described
this legislation as a "cartelist's Nirvana. ' '298 Kahn continued that he
had "never heard anyone . . . ask for government enforcement of tariffs
that it does not have the authon'y to disallow. ,,299 The primary limitation on
the carriers' ability to achieve monopolistic returns will be their own
inability to obtain agreements at profit-maximizing levels of service and
rates.
The United States has a particularly pressing reason for controlling
excesses in the ocean shipping industry. Approximately seventy percent
of shipping revenues in the U.S. trades are received by foreign carri-
ers.30° Thus, only about thirty percent of the monopolistic rents exacted
by liner agreements would benefit U.S. flag carriers. To the extent that
rates are increased, therefore, U.S. exports will suffer and U.S. dollars
will be transferred to foreign firms, further impairing the U.S. balance
of payments.
Monopolistic rates in this foreign-dominated industry also may have a
more subtle adverse effect on the U.S. economy. The demand for ocean
shipping services is a derived demand, 30' and rates are set independently
for specific items.30 2 Profit-maximizing cartels will attempt to exact all
the monopoly profits available for each product shipped. For example,
if U.S. producers of a particular product are able to charge foreign pur-
chasers a price per unit above their marginal costs, a knowledgeable
carrier cartel will set its rates at a level that exacts the entire excegs over
the producers' marginal cost. More accurately, the carriers will inicrease
the marginal costs of the foreign sales until U.S. producers receive only a
298. Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law, May 19, 1983,
quoted in H.R. REP. No. 53, supra note 200, pt. 2, at 80.
299. Id (emphasis added).
300. Testimony of James C. Miller, III, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Before the Subcomm.
on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judciary, 12 (May 18, 1983)
(prepared statement to be published in Hearings on HR. 1878, Sh;Oiping Act of 1983, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983) [hereinafter cited as HR 1878 Hearings]).
301. The demand for shipping services is derived from the demand for the product being
shipped.
302. See supra text accompanying notes 58-62 and bn/fa text accompanying note 3iL3
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competitive return. Were the producers able to take the full monopoly
rents, increased capital would flow into the domestic industry, ex-
panding U.S. production and employment.
The apparent faith of some that shipping conferences will practice
self-restraint finds little support in history. Both major congressional
investigations of the shipping industry - the Alexander Report303 and
the Celler Report3° 4 - revealed that conferences engage in activities
characteristic of cartels.305 Under the proposed law, the shipping indus-
try will be invited to maximize its profits using cartel practices. The
notion that strengthened ocean shipping cartels will make service and
rate determinations in ways that increase social utility, while ignoring
their potential returns, flies in the face of common sense, historical prac-
tice, and economic reality. This is not to say that ocean common carri-
ers are particularly devious or lacking in business ethics; rather, over
time, carriers will maximize profits with the unprecedented advantage
of legally acting as a cartel with authority to set its own rates.
Although ocean carriage is considered vital to healthy international
commerce and to the transport of supplies during times of war and other
crises,, liner conferences cannot be expected to act in the public interest
out of patriotic fervor. Ocean carriage is perhaps the quintessential in-
ternational industry. Even if one assumes that each country's national-
flag carriers are committed to their nation's well-being, when they act in
the context of conferences, with no common national interest, loyalties
become diverse. U.S. flag carriers are in the minority in conferences
serving U.S. trades, and studies indicate that foreign carriers have voted
in blocs against U.S. interests.3° 6
The proposed legislation increases the risk of anticompetitive behav-
ior by eliminating the deterrent of private antitrust suits,30 7 even for
secret, unfiled agreements. 3°a Injured private parties must seek relief
through the FMC,3°9 an agency historically lax in enforcing the Ship-
ping Act.310 Injured parties will be entitled to recover only actual dam-
ages31' plus interest, upon proof that the conduct violates the vague
303. ALEXANDER REPORT, supre note 17.
304. CELLER REPORT, supra note 106.
305. See supra text accompanying notes 86-87, 106-1I.
306. Se supra text accompanying note 108.
307. S. 47, supra note 2, § 8(c)(2); S. 47 (House Version), supra note 2, § 6(c)(2). The 1984 Act
disallows private antitrust suits. Shipping Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-237, § 7(c)(2), 98 Stat. 67, 74
(to be codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 1706(c)(2)).
308. S. 47, supra note 2, § 12(a)(1); S. 47 (House Version), supra note 2, § 9(a)(2).
309. S. 47, supra note 2, § 13; S. 47 (House Version), supra note 2, § 10.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 112-14.
311. S. 47,supra note 2, § 13(0; S. 47 (House Version), supra note 2, § 10(g). The FMC may, in
its discretion, direct payment of up to twice the amount of actual injury only in certain situations.
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standards of the "prohibited acts" section.31 2 The proposed civil en-
forcement mechanism would discourage injured shippers and carriers
from attempting to vindicate their rights unless the illegal acts are mani-
fest and the injury severe.
The proposed legislation represents a major change in the regulatory
philosophy of the Shipping Act, by limiting the role of the FMC as a
regulator of shipping conferences while continuing its function as an en-
forcer of conference agreements. This limitation of the government's
function as a mediator between the public's interest in the benefits of
competition and the traditions of the ocean liner industry might subject
U.S. shippers and consumers to monopolistic abuse without any assur-
ance that there will be countervailing gains.
B. Discrimination
One of the more troubling aspects of the proposals under considera-
tion is their propensity to foster discrimination. The rate structure of
ocean shipping is inherently discriminatory; rates are based on the value
of the goods shipped rather than the cost of the service. 313 Once set,
however, they generally apply equally to all shippers of like goods.3t 4
The proposed Shipping Act would permit discrimination among indi-
vidual shippers of similar goods by authorizing "service contracts. ' '3t5
Carriers could enter into service contracts with shippers that provide
rates and services other than those published in the particular carrier's
S. 47,supra note 2, § 13(0; S. 47 (House Version), supra note 2, § 10(g). A similar provision is found
in the 1984 Act. Shipping Act of 1984, § I1(g), 98 Stat. at 80-81 (to be codified at 46 U.S.C. app.
§ 1710(g)).
312. S. 47, supra note 2, § 12; S. 47 (House Version), supra note 2, § 9.
313. ,.r H. Rr.'. No. 611, supra note 4, pt. 2, at 25.
314. Se 46 U.S.C. § 817(b)(3) (1982). Section 18(3) of the Shipping Act of 1916 as amended
states in relevant part:
No common carrier by water in foreign commerce or conference of such carriers shall
charge or demand or collect or receive a greater or less or different compensation for the
transportation of property or for any service in connection therewith than the rates .and
charges which are specified in its tariffs on file with the Commission and duly published
and in effect at the time ....
Id
315. S. 47, supra note 2, § 9(c). The 1984 Act permits the use of service contracts under similar
terms. Shipping Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-237, § 8(c), 98 Stat. 67, 75 (to be codified at 46 U.S.C.
app. § 1707(c)). For a discussion of the provisions of the 1984 Act affecting service contracts, see
infia notes 390-95. The Senate version of the Shipping Act of 1983 defines service contract as follows:
[S]ervice contract means a contract between a shipper and an ocean common carrier or
conference in which the shipper makes a commitment to provide a certain minimum
quantity of cargo over a fixed time period, and the ocean common carrier or conference
commits to a certain rate or rate schedule as well as a defined service level - such as,
assured space, transit time, port rotation, or similar service features; the contract may also
specify provisions in the event of nonperformance on the part of either party
S. 47, supra note 2, § 3(22). The 1984 Act contains an identical definition. Shipping Act of 1984,
§ 3(21), 98 Stat. at 69 (to be codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 1702(21))
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or conference's tariff.3 1 6 Large, powerful shippers would be the likely
beneficiaries of this provision. In this industry, with high fixed costs and
fixed sailing schedules, the competition among carriers for the trade of
large-volume shippers will be great, particularly during times of slack
demand. Carriers might be motivated to provide service to large-vol-
ume shippers at rates approaching the costs of loading and unloading
while exacting large profits from smaller shippers. Those shippers large
enough to obtain favorable service contracts could be placed at a com-
petitive advantage over their less influential competitors, 31 7 an advan-
tage not related to the efficiencies of the competing firms.
Discrimination in transportation industries has been of significant
concern to Congress since the latter half of the nineteenth century. In
fact, discriminatory railroad rates, induced by large shippers, were a pri-
mary reason for the enactment of both the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission Act and the Sherman Act. 3 18 The elimination of preferential
rates and rebates also has been a principal goal of Shipping Act enforce-
ment.3 19 Contrary to this historical aversion to discriminatory rates, the
explicit legalization of service contracts would appear to institutionalize
a preferential rate structure.
The availability of service contracts also reduces a significant source
of pressure on conferences to keep their rates at a fair level for all ship-
pers. The reduction in tariff rates at the instance of a powerful shipper
generally works to the benefit of all shippers of the particular commod-
ity.320 Service contracts, however, would allow carriers to provide off-
tariff rates to the large shipper, without lowering rates to others. This
might pose a particular threat to independent carriers, as conferences
will be able to offer the same rates as an independent carrier to the
major shippers without lowering their rates to low-volume shippers.
• Several factors, however, militate against the possible use and abuse
of service contracts. First, there does not appear to be any limitation on
the right of conference members to prohibit the use of service contracts,
either individually 6r collectively. 32 1 If significant conferences bar serv-
ice contracts or reserve them for conference determination, the potential
316. S. 47, supra note 2,§9(c).
317. Set CELLER REPORT, supra note 99, at 251.
318. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STAT-
UTES I 1 (E. Kintner ed. 1978); H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, ORGANIZATION
OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION 85-94 (1954).
319. S. REP. No. 3, supra note 44, at 2; H.R. REP. No. 53, supra note 200, pt. 2, at 2.
320. See 46 U.S.C. § 817(b)(3) (1982)..
321. Se S.47, supra note 2, §§ 5(c), 9(c). The 1984 Act does not place any limitation on the
right of conference members to prohibit the use of service contracts. See Shipping Act of 1984,
§§ 5(c), 8(c), 98 Stat. at 71, 75 (to be codified at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1704(c), 1707(c)).
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bargaining strength of shippers will be diminished. Individual carriers,
however, may act independently 322 or withdraw323 from membership to
take advantage of an opportunity to capture the trade of a substantial
shipper. Second, service contracts must be made available to "all ship-
pers similarly situated. '324 That this requirement will prevent carriers
from entering into contracts favoring one or several shippers is unlikely.
The level of service required by a large shipper would readily differenti-
ate it from smaller firms to the extent that they are arguably not "simi-
larly situated" within the meaning of the statute.325 Third, and perhaps
most meaningful, the list of prohibited acts includes a limitation on the
abusive use of service contracts. 326 Common carriers may not "make or
give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particu-
lar person .... "327 The injured shipper has the burden of proving
that this indefinite standard has been met. 328 Finally, service contracts
provide a new source of competition to an industry resistant to market
forces. Carriers will no longer be able to refuse to negotiate with indi-
vidual shippers because the law prohibits off-tariff rates-or services. 329
Shippers may therefore be able to use their large shipping orders to ne-
gotiate for better rates from the carriers, and liner firms will have a vehi-
cle to compete for the trade of major shippers. This competition may
produce lower overall rates and could ultimately destabilize liner
cartels.
A healthy development under the proposed legislation is that service
contracts would be filed and a summary of their significant provisions
disclosed to the public. 33° Efforts to provide favored shippers with spe-
cial rates have produced numerous devices resulting in direct and indi-
rect rebates.3 3 t Because rebating is a malpractice 32 and, at least in its
322. S. 47, supra note 2, § 5(d).
323. Id § 5(c)(3).
324. Id at § 9(c).
325. Ste id
326. S. 47 (House Version), supra note 2, § 9(l 1). The Senate version of S. 47 eliminates this
restriction, but it does prohibit "any unfair or unjustly discriminatory contract." S. 47,upra note 2,
§ 12(b)(6).
327. S. 47 (House Version), supra note 2, § 9(11).
328. S. 47, supra note 2, § 6(e).
329. S. 47, supra note 2, § 8(c).
330. S. 47, supra note 2, § 9(c). The 1984 Act requires the filing of a service contract and a
concise statement of its essential terms. Shipping Act of 1984, § 8(c), 98 Stat, at 75 (to be codified
at 46 U.S.C. app. § 1707(c)).
331. CELLER REPORT, supra note 99, at 253.
332. Se id. at 249. The Celler Report defines malpractice as "an act, omission, or course of
dealing in connection with commercial liner operations which violates a provision of the Shipping
Act, a conference agreement or regulation, or commonly accepted standard of business ethics." Id.
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more direct forms, a violation of the Shipping Act, 333 these practices
must be concealed. The availability of service contracts would allow the
parties to negotiate directly about rates or services, and disclosure will
ensure a more knowledgeable market for both carriers and shippers.
Service contracts introduce a new, or at least more overt, form of nat-
ural service competition to the ocean liner industry, but they also in-
crease the risk that small shippers will be the victims of unreasonable
discrimination. To strike a sound balance, adoption of the proposed leg-
islation must be accompanied by sensitive and reasoned enforcement by
the FMC of the prohibition against undue preferences.
C. Potentia/ Impact on Ports
Several sections of the Shipping Act have been interpreted to prevent
the diversion of traffic from its natural routing to a more distant facility.
The FMC has held that sections 16 and 17 of the Act 334 prohibit cargo
diversion or activities that equalize ports by absorbing differences in
land transportation costs. 33 5 The FMC also has refused to approve
agreements under section 15336 that would have these effects.
3 37
The rules protecting ports against the loss of traffic are based primar-
ily on statutory policies not administered by the FMC. Section 8 of the
Merchant Marine Act of 1920 seeks to foster the full development of
American port facilities,338 and section 205 of the Merchant Marine Act
of 1936 prohibits carriers from agreeing among themselves to prevent
another carrier from serving a port "at the same rates which it charges
at the nearest port already regularly served by it. ' '33 9 The Commission
has incorporated the goals of these related statutes into its Shipping Act
enforcement policies.34
Policies intended to ensure ports the right to handle cargoes from nat-
ural tributary territories have been strained in recent years by the
growth of containerization and multimodal transportation systems. 3 4t
The development of "minibridge" or "land-bridge" operations allows
carriers to charge a single rate for transport from one inland point in the
333. 46 U.S.C. § 815 (1982).
334. 46 U.S.C. §§ 815-816 (1982).
335. Dart Container Co. v. Fed. Maritime Comm'n, 639 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Sea-Land
Services, Inc. v. South Atlantic & Caribbean Line, Inc., 9 F.M.C. 338 (1966). But see Delaware
River Port Auth. v. Fed. Maritime Comm'n, 536 F.2d 391 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
336. 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1982).
337. Sacramento-Yolo Port Dist., Pacific Coast European Conference, 15 F.M.C. 15 (1971).
338. 46 U.S.C. § 867 (1982).
339. Id. § 1115.
340. Ste supra notes 334-37 and accompanying text.
341. See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
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United States to another overseas. 342 Cargo can be packed in containers
in the Midwest, for example, sent by rail or road to a designated ocean
port, and shipped to a foreign destination without being repacked. Al-
though the potential efficiencies are obvious, minibridge service alters
prior concepts of natural tributary territories and diverts traffic to fewer
ports. 3  The FMC has struck a balance by permitting minibridge oper-
ations while continuing to protect ports against the diversion of nearby
cargoes.344  The proposed act would likely disrupt that balance. It
would retain much of the relevant language of sections 16 and 17,345 but
the legislative history suggests that the existing interpretation should not
survive. Despite the policies that so strongly oppose cargo diversion,346
the Senate Report states:
This section [prohibiting unjust discrimination against ports] is not in-
tended, alone or in conjunction with any other act, to equalize opportunity between
shippers or ports, but rather to prohibit actions which are shown to be notjusti .&d
by all relevant transportation conditions. Carriers and shippers should not be
required by this subsection to engage in outdated and economically unsound prac-
tices, and rates, charges, and services should not be found to be unjustly discrimi-
natory because they result in changes in transportation patterns.4 7
The potential impact of the proposed act on those policies is not clear.
Nor is there a consensus among ports regarding the desirability of con-
tinued protection. Representatives of some ports have expressed con-
cern, 348 while others have actively sought to eliminate "port protection"
policies.3 9 The Chairman of the FMC believes that the policies of sec-
tion 8 and section 205 will have some bearing on the interpretation of
the proposed act's prohibition against unjust discrimination.350 The
goals of the legislation - an efficient, nationalized, multimodal ocean
transport industry - and its history, however, suggest that ports will not
enjoy the protection they have had in the past.
342. Note, C/altmeges to t4e Lqdaisy of Minibridge Trawportation Sstems, 1978 DuKE L. J. 1233,
1237.
343. Id at 1237-38.
344. Dart Container Co. v. Fed. Maritime Comm'n, 639 F.2d 808, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
345. S. 47, supra note 2, § 12(b)(6); S. 47 (House Version), supra note 2, §§ 9(b)(6), (!1). The
1984 Act amends little of the relevant language of sections 16 and 17. Shipping Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-237, § 20(b)(7), 98 Stat. 67, 89.
346. Se supra text accompanying notes 334-39.
347. S. REP. No. 3, supra note 44, at 35-36 (emphasis added).
348. See, e.g., Statement of the Massachusetts Port Authority and the Virginia Port Authority
on H.R. 1878 "The Shipping Act of 1983", Before the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commer-
cial Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary 117-18 (May 19, 1983). This statement to be
published in HR. 1878 Hearings, supra note 300.
349. See Letter from Richard D. Ford, Executive Director of the Port of Seattle to Hon. Slade
Gorton, Nov. 5, 1981, reprinted in Hearings on S. 1593 and S 125, supra note 153, at 454.
350. Letter from Alan Green, Jr., Chairman, Fed. Maritime Comm'n, to Hon. Peter W.
Rodino (Apr. 18, 1983), to be published in HR. 1878 Hearings, supra note 300.
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Policies that protect small ports may, of course, be unrealistic. There
appears to be a shift in the entire transportation industry to fewer, but
more efficient, multimodal firms.35' Fewer ports will thrive as a conse-
quence of this development:
Some port cities are in trouble because multimodal transportation
companies will doubtless funnel traffic into a handful of ports, thereby
cutting costs.
Nobody knows for certain which ports will suffer, but experts say
the East, West and Gulf coasts may end up being served by only two
or three major ports each, compared with a half dozen or more each
right now.35 2
The proposed act would likely accelerate this change.
Ports that lose substantial traffic will be primarily the victims of a
more efficient transport system, a natural and desirable consequence of
a market economy. The impact of a port's failure, however, on eco-
nomic development and employment in the area served by that port, as
well as the potential national defense implications of an international
transportation system dependent on a few large ports, would have made
a more focused discussion of the issue desirable and appropriate.
D. International Implications
Many nations are rethinking their implementation policies concern-
ing the competition rules governing their ocean shipping industry.35 3
Although the U.S. discovery procedures and treble damages irritate
many foreign nations, basic U.S. antitrust standards are no longer alien
to the international arena. Resistance by conference carriers to any
procompetitive developments in Europe, Canada, or elsewhere on the
basis of a new and strong commitment by the United States to interna-
tional shipping cartels would be unfortunate. Consider the irony of the
United States being perceived as a leading force in an anticompetitve
international movement.
IV. PROPOSALS
A. Stud Commission
Questionable premises3 54 underlying the proposed amendments to the
Shipping Act of 1916 and their potential adverse impact on shippers,
ports, and independent carriers suggest the need for a significant in-
dependent study prior to any major changes. There are substantial dif-
351. Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 1983, at 1, col. 6.
352. Id at 18, col. 1.
353 Se supra text accompanying notes 257-73.
354 See supra notes 58-81 and accompanying text.
1984]
Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ.
ferences between the ocean shipping industries of 1916 and of today.
Since 1916 the industry has experienced a technological revolution, 355
the ratification of the UNCTAD code,356 and the increased use of bilat-
eral agreements to share cargo between the parties' national-flag carri-
ers. 357  Containerization has increased the capital requirements of
carriers, 358 thinning the ranks of existing firms and creating new entry
barriers for potential competitors. 359 The power of conferences in this
tightly oligopolistic industry, therefore, will be substantially greater
than in the past.
The changing structure of land transportation systems, with increas-
ing integration of firms into multimodal conglomerates, 36° also renders
reliance on stronger ocean shipping cartels problematic. If shippers
come to rely on several strong "full service" firms that provide transport
from pick-up point to foreign destination, the existence of a shared mo-
nopoly in the ocean leg of that carriage may have untoward effects. The
existence of a "bottleneck monopoly" 361 in the center of an otherwise
efficient multimodal system would distort performance throughout the
industry. Monopoly profit-taking in the ocean sector would have unpre-
dictable, but clearly adverse, consequences for land carriers and shippers
alike. Moreover, if ocean carriers affiliate with multimodal conglomer-
ates, there is a substantial risk that the monopolistic practices of liner
firms will spill over into the domestic land transport sector. In short,
viewing ocean shipping as a discrete international industry unrelated to
domestic trucking and rail traffic is becoming less reasonable. This de-
velopment calls for a careful analysis before an increased commitment
to liner conferences is made.
During the 97th Congress, the House Committee on the Judiciary rec-
ognized the need for a comprehensive study and reported a bill that
would have established a "Commission on the Deregulation of Interna-
tional Ocean Shipping. '362 The Commission was retained in the bill
passed by the House 363 and it represents sound policy. The Commis-
355. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
356. See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
357. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
358. Set supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 341-43 and accompanying text.
361. See, e.g., Municipal Elec. Assoc. of Mass. v. SEC, 413 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1969): United
States v. Terminal R.R. Assoc., 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
362. H.R. 4374, supra note 1, § 18.
363. S. 47 (House Version), supra note 2, § 17. The 1984 Act does not provide for the establish-
ment of a "Commission on the Deregulation of International Ocean Shipping"; rather, it created
an Advisory Commission to become effective five and one-half years after the date of enactment of
the Act. Shipping Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-237, § 18(d), 98 Stat. 67, 85-86 (to be codified at 46
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sion, if created, should suggest ways to achieve three primary objectives:
(1) provide a regulatory structure, if one is necessary, that interferes as
little as possible with competitive forces in the ocean shipping industry;
(2) ensure that the regulatory structure adopted will promote the most
efficient organization of the industry; and, (3) harmonize, to the fullest
extent possible, U.S. policy with that of our major trading partners.
B. Flexible Review Standard
If addressing the perceived problems of the current regulatory system
without the benefit of a comprehensive, independent study is politically
imperative, statutory provisions should be retained which allow the
FMC to protect against conference overreaching. This protection could
best be achieved by establishing a reasonably flexible standard and re-
quiring the FMC to ensure the existence of a workably competitive
structure in all facets of U.S. transportation. The FMC also should re-
tain the authority to disapprove excessive or predatory rates.
The proposed legislation relies on a detailed, although vague, list of
prohibited acts to protect public interests.36 The experience of ninety
years of antitrust enforcement, however, has shown the impossiblity of
specifying all forms of conduct that unreasonably restrain trade. Chief
Justice Hughes described the twin vices of reliance on a specific list of
unreasonable conduct:
As a charter of freedom, the [Sherman] Act has a generality and
adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitu-
tional provisions. It does not go into detailed definitions which might
either work injury to legitimate enterprise or through particulariza-
tion defeat its purposes by providing loop holes for escape. 365
A general, flexible standard, one that would require the FMC to pro-
mote workable competition within the framework of the unique history
and international structure of ocean shipping, would avoid this
problem.
As long as the FMC is required to enforce tariffs established by carri-
ers acting in concert, 36 it should have the power to disapprove rates
that are excessive or so low that they clearly evidence a predatory intent.
A government regulatory body required to impose rates set by shipping
U.S.C. app. § 1717(d)). For a discussion of the establishment and duties of the Advisory Commis-
sion, see infta notes 401-04.
364. See supra note 219 and accompanying text. For the language of § 9, see supra note 223.
The 1984 Act contains a similar provision. Shipping Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-237, § 10, 98 Stat.
67, 77-80 (to be codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 1709).
365. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933).
366. See 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1982).
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cartels on U.S. consumers and shippers, without regard to the reasona-
bleness of those rates, is almost inconceivable.
C. Structural Controls
Any modification of the Shipping Act also should continue to recog-
nize the benefits of a structure that will support competition. The two
provisions of section 15 that currently ensure a reasonably competitive
market structure - open conferences and a limited right of independent
action 367 - would be retained in the proposed Shipping Act. Given the
increasingly oligopolistic structure of the industry and high cost barriers
caused by containerization, 368 as well as the reduced FMC oversight
that would result if the new legislation were enacted, two additional
amendments are necessary to provide a structure that can support non-
conference carriers by guaranteeing them access to ports and an ade-
quate volume of goods. First, clear prohibition against agreements that
foreclose ports to any carrier would provide access to needed terminal
facilities. Second, limiting the volume of tonnage that may be bound to
particular carriers or conferences through loyalty contracts would like-
wise ensure a market for independent carriers. A reasonable solution
suggested is that no more than seventy percent of any shipper's goods be
subject to loyalty contracts.369
These two restrictions would allow independent carriers to capture
business from conferences charging excessive rates. Ports could not ex-
clude independents nor charge them discriminatory rates. Furthermore,
a limitation on the volume of goods subject to loyalty contracts would
ensure sufficient trade to justify independent entry. These restrictions
would not guarantee independent carriers any business. Shippers would
still have an incentive to ship all their goods on the vessels of conferences
or carriers with which they have contracts, because to seek out and ne-
gotiate with several carriers is inconvenient and likely expensive. Such
restrictions would, however, ensure that independent carriers will not be
precluded from competing if contract rates become excessive. More-
over, even if carriers were able to tie only a fixed percentage of each
contract shipper's goods through loyalty agreements, carriers would be
able to make future plans with reasonable certainty, while being en-
couraged to moderate their pricing practices.
367 Id.
368. See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
369. European Shippers Seek Narrow E&cptions, supra note 261, at 739; Mariime Antitrust Oversight
Hearings, supra note 49, at 65 (statement of George E. Garvey); see id. at 105 (statement of Thomas
J. Campbell and Robert D. Tollison).
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D. Tariff Enforcement
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Federal Maritime Com-
mission should either assume the traditional role of a regulator, ensuring
shippers and consumers reasonably competitive rates, or leave rate set-
ting and tariff enforcement to private commercial means. The coercive
power of the U.S. government should not be used to enforce a cartel's
agreement.
V. CONCLUSION
For more than fifty years Congress has, through various federal mari-
time agencies, attempted to capture for U.S. shippers and consumers the
perceived benefits of liner cartels.3 70 Experience has taught that the task
is indeed difficult. Prior to 1961 the regulatory bodies were ineffectual
and conferences behaved as economic theory suggests - discriminating
against shippers, running roughshod over independent competitors, and
battling among themselves for market share. 371
Since the Shipping Act was amended in 1961,372 and the FMC was
charged with protecting the public interest,373 the conferences have been
more restrained.374 Advocates of closed conferences claim, however,
that the introduction of competitive norms through the public interest
standard has made the efficient organization of conferences impossi-
ble.375 The spector of antitrust liability allegedly prevents U.S. firms in
particular from collaborating to form structures that can compete effec-
tively in the ocean shipping industry.376
Regardless of the merits of the carrier's claims, the 98th Congress is
almost certain to alter the Shipping Act substantially, and those changes
will doubtless shift back in the direction of fewer regulatory constraints.
Congress will reaffirm its belief that a largely self-regulated system of
ocean liner cartels is beneficial to the American public. There is, how-
ever, reason to hope that this shift will not signal a return to the age of
fighting ships and excessive rates.
Congress has been assured by the industry that self-regulation will
strengthen U.S. flag carriers and bring about significant efficiencies that
370. See supra notes 82-92 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
372. Act of Oct. 3, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-346, 75 Stat. 762 (amending various sections of 46
U.S.C. §§ 800-842 (1982)).
373. Id
374. But set supra text accompanying notes 205-18. The North Atlantic Container, Sabre Shtpping
and Rates on US 6ooent Cargoes cases suggest that the conferences were not very restrained. Id
375. Set supra note 151 and accompanying text.
376. See supra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
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will benefit U.S. shippers and consumers.3 7 7 If the industry does not
restrain itself under these circumstances, liner conferences will likely
find this proposed legislation to be their "last hurrah." Monopolistic
rates and aggressive predation surely would generate support for either
rigid, detailed regulation or the total elimination of antitrust immu-
nity.3 7 8 Moderation of their practices would, therefore, be in the inter-
est of liner cartels, and U.S. flag carriers would do well to see that their
foreign collaborators appreciate this U.S. sensitivity.
Some characteristics of the ocean carriage industry might make car-
tels inherently unstable. The great variance between liner firms' size,
profitability, and technological capabilities, for example, will make it
difficult to reach a consensus about optimal rates and services. The
threat of increased reliance on bilateral agreements may also moderate
conference practices. How this industry will organize itself in light of
new shipping technology, multimodalism, and possible changes in na-
tional and international laws cannot be predicted. These new develop-
ments may facilitate agreement, but they also may frustrate them.
The proposed changes also call for vigorous and knowledgeable en-
forcement by the FMC. Fortunately, the current FMC Chairman has
been committed to improving the enforcement practices of the agency,
as was his predecessor. The FMC, however, would have little authority
to disapprove agreements. It must, therefore, react with vigor and im-
pose significant penalties when egregious prohibited acts are detected.
As the enforcer of conference agreements, the FMC would have its lim-
ited resources strained, but it should set priorities to accelerate investiga-
tions and prosecute serious offenses.
The legislation under consideration represents a truly extraordinary
U.S. commitment to cartels. The combination of market forces, aggres-
sive enforcement, and carrier self-restraint may result in an efficient
ocean shipping industry, with the benefits inuring to the U.S. public.
The risks are high, however, and past performance suggests that carriers
will revert to old and worn patterns.
ADDENDUM
The Shipping Act of 198437 9 (hereinafter cited as the 1984 Act) was
enacted by Congress on March 6, 1984 and became law on March 20,
1984.380
377. Set supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
378. Cf Hmanrgs on H.R. 6899 supra note 99, at 61 (statement of the Hon. Paul N. McCloskey,
Jr.).
379. Pub. L. No. 98-327, 98 Stat. 67 (to be codified at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1701-1719 (1982)).
380. The committee on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the
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to present a united front to the demands of shippers is likely to reduce
the competitive impact of legalized service contracts. The congressional
changes seem to have strengthened the positions of liner cartels and
large shippers at the expense of small and medium sized shippers.. The
law as enacted, therefore, increases the likelihood of discrimination
against less powerful shippers, while reducing the competitive advan-
tages likely to flow from the use of service contracts.3 9 5
Loyalty contracts will be permitted only if they comply with the anti-
trust laws. 39 Non-compliance with the antitrust laws, however, will not
result in antitrust liability,39 7 but rather give rise to an action for viola-
tion of the provisions of the 1984 Act. 398 This restriction on loyalty con-
tracts might eliminate a tying device that historically has strengthened
conference power, 399 but it is just as likely to shift conference energy to
more discriminatory devices such as service contracts and time-volume
rates. Under prior law, small shippers were assured an opportunity to
obtain discounted rates when loyalty contracts were employed.4° ° The
ability of carriers to obtain commitments from large shippers by provid-
ing special rates through service or time-volume contracts, however,
may render loyalty contracts unnecessary and perhaps undesirable from
the carriers' perspective.
Elimination of the "Commission on the Deregulation of International
Ocean Shipping" 4 1 is the last major change in the law adopted by the
conference committee. In its stead, the conferees created an "Advisory
Commission on Conferences in Ocean Shipping" that will come into
existence five and one-half years after the 1984 Act becomes effective. 4 °2
During the first five years of implementation of the 1984 Act, the FMC
will collect data regarding the impact of the legislation on the ocean
395. See supra notes 315-20 and accompanying text.
396. See Shipping Act of 1984, § 10(b)(9), 98 Stat. at 78 (to be codified at 46 U.S.C. app.
§ 1709(b)(9)).
397. See id § 7(a)(2), 98 Stat. at 73 (to be codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 1706(a)(2)). For the full
text of § 7(a)(2), see supra note 381.
398. See Shipping Act of 1984, § 11, 98 Stat. at 80-81 (to be codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 1710).
Section 11 (a) states that "any person may file with the Commission a sworn complaint alleging a
violation of this Act, other than section 6(g), and may seek reparation for any injury caused to the
complainant by that violation." 1d. § 11(a), 98 Stat. at 80 (to be codified at 46 U.S.C. app.
§ 1710(a)). For a discussion of the amount of the award that may be received under the 1984 Act,
see supra note 384.
399. See supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
400. See 46 U.S.C. § 813(a). For a discussion of prior law dealing with the probability that
conference members will abuse their collective power, see supra notes 135-48.
401. See supra note 362 and accompanying text.
402. Shipping Act of 1984, § 18(d), 98 Stat. at 85-87 (to be codified at 46 U.S.C. app.
§ 1717(d)).
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shipping industry.403 The Advisory Commission will conduct a compre-
hensive analysis of the collected data and report its findings and recom-
mendations to Congress.4° 4
Under the new law there are limited checks on the power of carrier
cartels to exact monopolistic profits. The FMC may attempt to enjoin
those agreements that are likely to diminish service or unreasonably
raise rates.405 Past performance, 40 6 however, particularly when coupled
with diminished authority and newly-created procedural hurdles,40 7
suggests that the Commission will not protect adequately the public
interest.
The only realistic check on the monopolistic power of ocean shipping
conferences is likely to be market forces. The desires of the most efficient
liner companies to capture market share, together with competition for
service contracts, might ensure a reasonable level of competition. The
Shipping Act of 1984, however, offers liner firms the unique opportunity
to form tight cartels free from antitrust liability. If conferences are un-
able to exploit their monopolistic positions, it will be convincing evi-
dence that, regardless of the law, the competitive forces of the
marketplace will not be denied.
403. Id § 18(a), 98 Stat. at 85 (to be codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 17 17(a)).
404. Id § 18(h), 98 Stat. at 87 (to be codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 1717(h)).
405. Id § 6(h), 98 Stat. at 73 (to be codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 1705(h)).
406. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
407 See supra notes 385-86 and accompanying text.
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